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The "monetarist"  view of ...  the acceleration  of inflation  since 1965 [is] that it 
has been the ultimate  consequence  of an increase  in the rate  of world  monetary 
expansion,  an increase attributable  primarily  to the excessively expansionary 
monetary policy pursued by the United States in recent years.-Harry  G. 
Johnson' 
I find the alternative  explanation  ...  which  regards  the basic  cause as increased 
trade-union  militancy  ...  more  plausible.-Nicholas Kaldor2 
There is little doubt, then, that the wage-inflation  idea does not apply to the 
inflationary  experiences  we have  seen in the real world....  Only when  the mac- 
roeconomic implications  of the wage-inflation  hypothesis  are traced through 
and confronted  with the facts does it become apparent  that it cannot be sus- 
tained.-Arnold C. Harberger3 
Note: This research has been supported by the National Science Foundation. I 
am grateful  to my colleague John Bilson for aiding me in the acquisition  of data from 
the International  Monetary Fund, and to my research assistant  James Glassman for 
an absolutely outstanding job. Also  helpful were the suggestions of Victor Argy, 
Jacques  Artus, Jacob Frenkel, Hans Genberg, John Helliwell, Paul Krugman,  David 
Laidler, Michael Parkin, Richard Sweeney, George Zis, and members of the Brook- 
ings panel. Of special value were a number  of discussions  with Christopher  Sims. 
1. Harry G. Johnson, "Inflation: A  'Monetarist'  View," in Harry G. Johnson, 
Further Essays in Monetary Economics (Allen & Unwin, 1972), p. 335. 
2.  Nicholas Kaldor, "Inflation  and Recession in the World Economy," Economic 
Journal,  vol. 86 (December 1976), p. 710. 
3. Arnold C. Harberger,  "Inflation,"  in John Van Doren, ed., Symposium on the 
Emerging World Economy (Great Ideas Today series)  (Encyclopaedia Britannica 
Educational Corporation, 1976), pp. 94-106. 
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WHILE  "SUPPLY  SHOCKS"  in oil and food are widely agreed to have ag- 
gravated  inflation  in many countries  in 1973-75, no consensus  has yet 
emerged  to explain  the acceleration  of inflation  between  the mid-1960s 
and 1970-72 in the major  industrialized  nations  outside  of North Amer- 
ica. Instead,  two major  schools  of thought,  the "international  monetarist" 
and the "wage push," have developed alternative  explanations  having 
radically  different  policy implications. The first group views inflation 
within a conventional  macroeconomic  framework  as an "international 
monetary  phenomenon"  and  identifies  its fundamental  cause  as an excess 
demand  for commodities  generated  by government  actions.  Any attempt 
to bring  in other factors,  particularly  those of the wage-push  variety,  is 
dismissed.  Adherents  of the  wage-push  or "sociological"  school  of thought 
disagree, pointing to the allegedly spontaneous  wage explosions that 
occurred  in a number  of European  countries  in 1968 and 1970 as evi- 
dence of the special  noneconomic  character  of the recent  inflation.  Wage 
claims are viewed as part of a continuing  conflict over income shares 
among competing  social groups, and the events of the 1968-70 period 
reflected  labor's  "long-smouldering  resentment  and  dissatisfaction."4 
Aims of the  Paper 
The sources  of inflation  in the main  industrialized  nations  in the period 
of fixed exchange  rates have not yet been adequately  established.  Both 
the international-monetarist  and  wage-push  arguments  are  unsatisfactory 
and  incomplete. The acceleration  of wages and prices  in 1969-70 in the 
major  nations  outside  of the United  States  followed  a continuing  decelera- 
tion of their  rates of monetary  growth  between 1963 and 1969. For the 
"world"-the  United States plus seven other important  industrial  na- 
4.  Kaldor, "Inflation and Recession," p. 710. In his more eclectic analysis of 
wages, George L. Perry considers  wage push, closely associated  with a dissatisfaction 
with shares, an important part of the wage explosions of the 1968-70 period, and 
consequently one of the factors that brought the average rate of wage inflation in 
the 1970s to a new, higher, plateau. See his "Determinants  of Wage Inflation around 
the World,"  BPEA, 2:1975, pp. 403-35.  Earlier, William D. Nordhaus had rejected 
a related explanation labeled "frustration  theories" in "The Worldwide Wage Ex- 
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tions5-the  1969-70  acceleration  of wage rates preceded  by almost a 
year  the 1971 explosion  of money  and  international  reserves,  in apparent 
conflict  with the international-monetarist  explanation.  Wage-push  pro- 
ponents  have not made their case either,  because autonomous  wage in- 
creases  do not automatically  pass  into  the  price  level. 
This  paper  accepts  from  the outset  the proposition  that  world  inflation 
must  in the long run  be a world  monetary  phenomenon.  Confirmation  of 
a connection  between  the rates of growth  of world  money and prices, as 
in several  recent  studies,  is viewed  as only the first  step  in the development 
of a fuller  understanding  of the inflation  process,  because  the sources  of 
changes  in world money are left unexplained.6  A  correlation  between 
world  prices  and  money  does not rule out wage  push as a source  of world 
monetary  growth.  Instead  of viewing  international  monetary  and wage- 
push  factors  as competitive  explanations  of inflation,  a more  comprehen- 
sive theoretical  framework  is presented  which incorporates  these two 
ingredients  as possible explanations  of the behavior of the monetary 
authorities,  together  with fiscal deficits, supply shocks, and a counter- 
cyclical  monetary  reaction  function. 
Since a time-series  correlation  between  inflation  and monetary  growth 
is consistent  with several  sources  of monetary  growth,  a more discrimi- 
nating empirical  methodology  is required.  An impirical study of the 
United  States  and seven other  major  industrial  nations  attempts  to deter- 
mine whether  the data are consistent  with an effect of any or all of the 
possible  sources  of monetary  accommodation. 
Among the major  questions  to be answered  are the following:  If U.S. 
monetary  growth  is to be blamed  for the acceleration  of inflation  in other 
countries,  by what  channels  was this impulse  transmitted?  Did patterns  of 
causation  differ  among  countries?  Were some countries  better  able than 
others  to pursue  countercyclical  rather  than  procyclical  monetary  policies? 
Did differences  across  countries  in the degree  of accommodation  to supply 
shocks in 1974 correspond  with the degree  of accommodation  to wage 
5. The  "Other Seven" countries are  Canada, France, West  Germany, Italy, 
Japan,  Sweden,  and the United Kingdom. 
6.  See, for instance, David I. Meiselman, "Worldwide  Inflation: A  Monetarist 
View," in Meiselman and Arthur B. Laffer, eds., The Phenomenon of Worldwide 
Inflation (American Enterprise  Institute, 1975), pp. 69-112. See also Hans Genberg 
and Alexander K. Swoboda, "Causes and Origins of the Current Worldwide Infla- 
tion,"  discussion paper  (Geneva:  Graduate Institute of  International Studies, 
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push or reserve  inflows  in the earlier  period?  Do episodes  of wage push 
identified  by others  appear  to have  been  genuinely  exogenous  or were  they 
preceded  by episodes  of monetary  accommodation?  Can the breakdown 
of the Bretton  Woods  system  be treated  ultimately  as another  casualty  of 
the Vietnam  War,  or did  domestic  events  in other  countries  play a role? 
Answers  to these  questions  are  useful  not only for an understanding  of 
history, but for future policymaking:  Is control of the money supply 
either  necessary  or sufficient  for a nation  to control  its inflation  rate?  Is it 
likely that monetary  authorities  will be able in the future  to insulate  the 
inflation  rate from the tendencies  to wage push, or are incomes  policies 
required  as a cure? 
Finally,  the paper  raises  a methodological  question  of interest  to many 
economists  caught  in the middle  without  any particular  allegiance  to an 
international-monetarist  or wage-push  view of the world: Can  economet- 
ric techniques  uncover  systematic  tendencies  toward  procyclical  accom- 
modation  or countercyclical  activism  on the part of central  banks,  or do 
shifting  targets  and priorities  defy statistical  generalizations  and call in- 
stead  for a more  descriptive  and  anecdotal  approach  to monetary  history? 
International-Monetarist  Approach 
The international-monetarist  approach  begins from the proposition 
that  under  fixed  exchange  rates  the world  inflation  rate  is determined  pri- 
marily  by previous changes  in the rate of growth of the world money 
supply.  This follows from two basic propositions  which previously  had 
been emphasized  by U.S. monetarists  addressing  issues  of a closed econ- 
omy: the stability  of the demand-for-money  function,  and  the lack of any 
long-run tradeoff  between inflation  and unemployment.  Both of these 
elements  have been tested by international-monetarist  economists  who 
have estimated structural equations describing the behavior of  the 
demand-for-money  function  and the expectational  Phillips  curve  for the 
"world"  (usually  the Group  of Ten).7 Further,  reduced-form  tests have 
7.  See M. R. Gray, R. Ward, and G. Zis, "The World Demand for Money Func- 
tion: Some Preliminary  Results,"  and Nigel Duck and others, "The  Determination  of 
the Rate of Change of Wages and Prices in the Fixed Exchange Rate World Econ- 
omy, 1956-71," both in Michael Parkin and George Zis, eds., Inflation in the World 
Economy (Manchester  University Press and University of Toronto Press, 1976), pp. 
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found that changes  in the world rate of monetary  growth  have preceded 
changes  in the world  inflation  rate.8 
The behavior  of individual  countries  is characterized  not only  by stable 
national demand-for-money  functions and vertical long-run Phillips 
curves, but by two additional  features.  First, capital is mobile among 
nations,  so that international  reserves  tend to flow in or out as necessary 
to set a nation's  money supply equal to its demand  for money, which 
depends  primarily  on its price level, real output,  and interest  rate.9  Sec- 
ond, commodity  arbitrage  maintains  the tradable-goods  portion of the 
domestic  price  level fairly  close to the world  price  level of tradable  goods, 
while labor mobility  communicates  changes  in prices of tradable  goods 
to the nontradables  sector.10  Thus any event that raises  the foreign  price 
level tends to push up both the domestic  price level and the domestic 
money supply, irrespective  of the reaction of the domestic monetary 
authorities. 
The international-monetarist  approach  traces  the acceleration  of infla- 
tion outside  the United  States  in the late 1960s back to U.S. fiscal  deficits 
incurred  to pay for Vietnam  expenditures,  which  induced  an acceleration 
in the growth  rate  of the U.S. money  supply  and  price  level. Inflation  then 
spread  from  the United  States  to other  countries  by four  main  channels  of 
transmission."  First, the "direct  price influence"  working  through  com- 
modity arbitrage  raised the prices of tradable  goods everywhere.  This 
then pushed  up the marginal  value product  of labor and of other  factors 
of production  and  hence domestic  costs, raising  the prices  of nontradable 
8. See Genberg  and Swoboda, "Causes  and Origins." 
9.  See Robert A.  Mundell, International Economics (Macmillan, 1968),  chap. 
18; also  Harry G.  Johnson, "The Monetary Approach to  Balance-of-Payments 
Theory,"  in Johnson,  Further  Essays in Monetary  Economics, pp. 229-49. 
10. Rudiger Dornbusch, "Devaluation, Money, and Nontraded Goods," Ameri- 
can Economic Review, vol. 63 (December 1973), pp. 871-80. The Dornbusch  model 
is extended  to the case of imperfectly  flexible prices in Robert J. Gordon, "Interrela- 
tions Between Domestic  and International Theories of  Inflation," in  Robert Z. 
Aliber, ed., The Political Economy of Monetary Reform (Macmillan, 1977),  pp. 
126-54. 
11. An excellent general discussion of  the channels through which inflation is 
transmitted  can be found in Walter S. Salant, "International  Transmission  of Infla- 
tion,"  in Lawrence  B. Krause  and Walter  S. Salant,  eds., Worldwide  Inflation:  Theory 
and Recent Experience (Brookings Institution, 1977), pp. 167-227. See also Alex- 
ander K. Swoboda, "Monetary Approaches to Worldwide Inflation," in the same 
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goods.'2  Second,  the trade  surpluses  of other  nations  induced  by the fact 
that U.S. income growth  was higher than their own, as well as by de- 
teriorating  U.S. price competitiveness,  boosted foreign  levels of produc- 
tion and income  through  the conventional  "Keynesian  demand-pressure 
mechanism."  Third,  the "Bretton  Woods  monetization  channel"  allowed 
U.S. balance-of-payments  deficits  to be paid for by the creation  of U.S. 
dollar  liabilities  which  expanded  the monetary  base of many  nations  and 
further  fueled  their  own domestic  inflation  rates.  Fourth,  an acceleration 
of U.S. inflation  could have raised  domestic  expectations  of inflation  di- 
rectly, leading to higher wage and price increases.  The channels  were 
connected,  since the direct effects of higher prices for tradable  goods, 
higher  real output,  and higher  expected  prices  for nontradable  goods, all 
raised  a nation's  transaction  demand  for money and, with freely mobile 
capital,  attracted  the international  reserves  needed  to bring  the domestic 
money  supply  into  equality  with  higher  money  demand. 
In the long run  under  fixed  exchange  rates,  then,  policymakers  in small 
countries  should regard inflation as part of the external environment 
rather  than under their own control. Domestic "wage  push" by unions 
cannot contribute  to domestic inflation;  worker groups that achieve a 
higher  nominal  wage  when  the price  level is determined  abroad  can raise 
their  own  incomes  only at the expense  of unemployment  and  lower  profits, 
particularly  in the tradable-goods  sector. Incomes policies designed  to 
control  wage  push  may  be able to influence  the unemployment  rate  or the 
distribution  of income,  but  not the inflation  rate. 
But the international  monetarist's  denial of a role for an autonomous 
wage  push  in the world  inflation  process  is not totally  convincing,  because 
the symmetry  between  tradable-goods  prices and domestic  wages is ig- 
nored.  Both are determinants  of domestic  prices and the transaction  de- 
mand for money. An autonomous  wage push could raise the demand 
for money  and,  with perfect  capital  mobility,  suck  in the reserves  needed 
to provide  the base for a higher  domestic  money supply.  If commodity 
arbitrage  is perfect,  the profits  of firms  in the tradable-goods  sector will 
be squeezed,  but there  is some evidence  that commodity  arbitrage  is not 
12. This is the primary channel of  international transmission in the "Scandi- 
navian" model of  inflation. See  Gbsta Edgren, Karl-Olof Faxen,  and Clas-Erik 
Odhner, "Wages, Growth and the Distribution of  Income," Swedish Journal of 
Economics, vol. 71 (September 1969), pp. 133-60. Also Odd Aukrust, "Inflation  in 
the Open Economy: A Norwegian Model," in Krause and Salant, eds., Worldwide 
Inflation,  pp. 107-53. Robert  J. Gordon  415 
perfect, at least in the short run.'3 The increase in domestic monetary 
growth would contribute to  an acceleration in world monetary growth 
and in the world rate of  inflation, particularly if  an autonomous wage 
push were to occur in several countries simultaneously. 
The Wage-Push, or "Sociological," Explanation 
In its most extreme form, proponents of  the wage-push view  argue 
that the inflation rate depends  entirely on  the  aggressiveness of  labor 
unions in pressing wage demands. Peter Wiles has claimed, for instance, 
that "we have moved from wage claims based on the actual situation in 
the trade ...  to claims picked out of the air...."14  The underlying source 
of wage push is viewed variously as a conflict over the fairness of  the 
income distribution and wage structure; as the result of the rise of the 
tactics of the New Left and the decline of authority; and as a consequence 
of a communications revolution that increased awareness of foreign wage 
claims. The  independent influence of  money  and aggregate demand is 
often viewed as negligible.'5 
While  money  is  sometimes  rejected  as  a  cause  of  wage  behavior, 
changes in money are viewed as a consequence of wage push in many dis- 
cussions. Sooner or later the central bank will have to raise the money 
supply in order to accommodate the higher transaction demand for money 
created by higher wages. Richard Cooper has made this point succinctly: 
The wage level in the modern economy is indeterminant  because in the 
final analysis  the monetary  authorities  must-for  political reasons-provide a 
money supply adequate  to ratify any given level of money wages, no matter 
how it was reached,  in order  to avoid  excessive  unemployment.'6 
13. See Irving B. Kravis and Robert E. Lipsey, "Export Prices and the Trans- 
mission of Inflation,"  American Economic Review, vol.  67  (February 1977),  pp. 
155-63. Also see Rudiger  Dornbusch and Paul Krugman,  "Flexible Exchange Rates 
in the Short Run,"  BPEA, 3:1976, especially pp. 559-68. 
14. Peter Wiles, "Cost Inflation and the State of Economic Theory," Economic 
Journal,  vol. 83 (June 1973), p. 378. 
15. A clear statement emphasizing  the fairness issue is contained in John Hicks, 
The Crisis  in Keynesian  Economics (Basic Books, 1974), chap. 3. 
16. Richard N. Cooper, statement in "Commentaries"  on paper by Thomas D. 
Willet, "The Eurocurrency  Market, Exchange-Rate  Systems, and National Financial 
Policies," in Carl H. Stem, John H. Makin, and Dennis E. Logue, eds., Eurocur- 
rencies and the International Monetary System  (American Enterprise Institute, 
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Some British commentators  admit the monetary  connection.'7  But this 
acknowledgment  is by no means  universal.'8 
Several  investigators  have found that wage equations  for major  Euro- 
pean countries  require  the use of dummy  variables  to explain  particular 
episodes of sudden  acceleration  in the rate of wage change.'"  While a 
significant  positive coefficient  on a dummy  variable  indicates  only that 
something  is happening  that cannot be otherwise  explained,  the timing 
of the wage accelerations  correspond  to widely recognized  incidents  of 
aggressive  labor behavior,  particularly  the French  general  strike  of May 
1968, and  the Italian  "hot  autumn"  of 1969. 
The wage-push  explanation  has been universally  condemned  by pro- 
ponents  of the international-monetarist  view, but empirical  critiques  by 
international  monetarists  have involved tests of unnecessarily  restrictive 
versions of the sociological approach.  For instance, any influence  on 
wages of excess commodity  or labor demand  or proxies  for inflationary 
expectations  is cited as negative  evidence,  implicitly  ruling  out a more 
eclectic framework  in which both the aggressiveness  of workers and 
conventional  economic  variables  might be influential.  Further,  tests by 
international  monetarists  have measured  wage-push  effects  by including 
variables  representing  time  lost in strikes  rather  than  the  dummy  variables 
cited  earlier.  To the extent  that  workers  achieve  their  wage  aims  by threats 
of strikes  that are not actually  carried  out, wage push could exist but 
nevertheless  be uncorrelated  with strike  variables.20  Unfortunately,  this 
17. Wiles, "Cost Inflation,"  p. 385; Stephen Marris, "Panel Discussion: World 
Inflation,"  in Claassen and Salin, eds., Stabilization  Policies in Interdependent  Econ- 
omies, p. 303. 
18. Aubrey Jones, for  instance, argues that  "a tightening of  the  supply of 
money is not, therefore,  ..  . a solution to the problem of rising prices,"  in The New 
Inflation:  The Politics oj Prices and Incomes (London: Andre Deutsch, and Penguin, 
1973),p.  39. 
19. See in particular George L. Perry, "Determinants  of Wage Inflation,"  espe- 
cially table 4, p. 424, in which significant coefficients are found for a dummy for 
1968 in France and for 1970 in Italy, West Germany, Sweden, and the United King- 
dom (a 1968 dummy for Japan is only marginally significant). A similar approach 
was followed by Erich Spitaller,  who found significant  dummy coefficients  in various 
periods for France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom; see "Semi-Annual 
Wage Equations for the Manufacturing  Sectors in Six Major Industrial  Countries," 
Review of World  Economics, no. 2 (1976), pp. 300-37. 
20. The most comprehensive tests of  strike variables are presented in  David 
Laidler, "Inflation-Alternative  Explanations and Policies: Tests on Data Drawn 
from Six Countries,"  in Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, Institutions, Policies 
and Economic Performance (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1976),  pp.  251-306. Robert  J. Gordon  417 
problem  makes  it difficult  to link puzzling  episodes  identified  by signifi- 
cant coefficients  on dummy  variables  to any quantifiable  proxy  for labor 
militancy. 
The  Demand  for  and  Supply  of Monetary  Accommodation 
International  monetary  effects and wage push are only two of the 
possible sources of inflation. A  useful framework  for analysis of the 
sources  of inflation  is to distinguish  factors that create pressure  on the 
central  bank to "accommodate"-that  is, to react by raising  the money 
supply-and factors  that  help to explain  why the central  bank  reacts  as it 
does to these pressures.  A "demand  for monetaly accommodation"  is 
created  by domestic  demand  shifts,  domestic  cost push, and demand  and 
supply  shocks from abroad.  The "supply  of monetary  accommodation" 
by the central  bank  depends  on the weights  in its countercyclical  reaction 
function,  its own degree  of independence  from the government,  and the 
extent  of the government's  attempts  to influence  its chances  for reelection 
by manipulating  the economy.21 
THE  DEMAND  FOR  MONETARY  ACCOMMODATION 
When  the real money  supply  is held constant,  an increase  in domestic 
expenditures  will tend  to alter  interest  rates,  whether  its source  is a change 
in consumer  attitudes,  business expectations,  government  spending,  or 
tax rates.  An increase  in spending  shifts the "IS curve"  of intermediate 
macroeconomic  theory  to the right  up a fixed  "LM  curve,"  and  the central 
bank  is forced  to raise  the money  supply  if it desires  to offset  part  or all of 
the  increase  in interest  rates  that  would  otherwise  occur. 
Central banks may be under pressure  not only from autonomous 
shifts  in demand,  but also from  autonomous  increases  in wages  and  prices 
negotiated  in the private  sector,  and  from  external  supply  shocks.  At first 
glance  the motivation  for wage  push  may  seem elusive,  at least in a closed 
Laidler has pointed out to me that strike variables were first used by British cost- 
push proponents,  not by international  monetarists  who were seeking to test the cost- 
push hypothesis. 
21. A more formal and extended presentation  of this framework is developed in 
Robert J. Gordon, "The Demand for and Supply of Inflation,"  Journal of Law and 
Economics, vol. 18 (December 1975), pp. 807-36. 418  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1977 
economy,  since prices are likely to be marked  up over any autonomous 
wage increases  achieved  by workers,  leaving  real wages unchanged.  But 
workers  who "push"  may  achieve  an increase  in their  real  income  relative 
to holders  of assets  with  returns  fixed  in nominal  terms,  workers  who have 
less market  power,  and  profits  of firms  in the tradable-goods  sector.  Sup- 
ply shocks-for  example,  crop failures  or the formation  of commodity 
cartels-are like any other  type of cost push  in creating  problems  for the 
monetary  authorities,  because  a failure  to accommodate  will create  unem- 
ployment,  while accommodation  may unleash an inflationary  spiral if 
workers  attempt  to maintain  their  original  real  wage  levels  intact. 
International  capital  mobility  may embolden  workers  and others  con- 
sidering  an autonomous  push,  since  their  own actions  can directly  induce 
a rise in the money supply  by pulling in international  reserves.  In this 
case the push is automatically  accommodated.  Only when capital  is less 
than perfectly  mobile can the central  bank attempt  to sterilize  part of 
the reserve  inflow  by open-market  sales of its domestic  assets,  a restrictive 
rediscount  policy, or an increase in the reserve requirements  of com- 
mercial  banks. 
THE  SUPPLY  OF  MONETARY  ACCOMMODATION 
AND  THE  MONETARY  REACTION  FUNCTION 
The mere  existence  of pressure  on the central  bank  does not imply  that 
it will act either  to accommodate  or to resist. A central  bank following 
Friedman's  rule of a constant  growth  rate for the money supply would 
ignore such pressures  entirely.  More likely, a central  bank will attempt 
to vary  the growth  of the money supply,  or some other  monetary  instru- 
ment over which it believes it has more direct control,  with the aim of 
maximizing  a social-welfare  function.  Higher unemployment  and infla- 
tion,  and  lower  foreign-exchange  reserves,  are  all evils  that  may  be resisted 
by countervailing  shifts  in monetary  policy. 
Two sets of conflicts constrain  the reaction of policymakers.  First, 
even an idealistic  attempt  to maximize  society's  welfare  collides with the 
incompatibility  of  short-run  improvements  in  unemployment  and in 
inflation,  or in unemployment  and  in the foreign  balance.  Wage  push  and 
supply shocks allow no easy solutions,  for a central  bank must choose 
whether  to resist  their  stimulus  to inflation  by contracting  or to resist  un- 
employment  by expanding. Robert  J. Gordon  419 
Second,  "idealistic"  weights  on target  variables  derived  from  economic 
theory may conflict with "popularity"  weights motivated  by political 
expediency.  Evidence  of a substantial  lag of inflation  behind  changes  in 
unemployment  introduces  a distinction,  stressed  by Lindbeck,  between 
short-run  targets,  which maximize  votes for an incumbent  government's 
reelection,  and  long-run  targets,  which  maximize  economic  welfare.22 
A Framework  for Empirical  Testing 
The general  framework  developed  in the preceding  section identifies 
a large number  of variables  upon which the behavior  of the domestic 
money  supply  may depend-private and government  expenditures,  wage 
push,  foreign  prices,  international  reserves,  domestic  unemployment,  and 
inflation.23  The aim of the empirical  section  is to determine  whether  any 
of the component  hypotheses  can be confirmed  or denied,  for the United 
States, for the "Other  Seven" (the aggregate  of seven major  industrial 
countries  besides the United States), or for any of the seven countries 
individually. 
CHAINS  OF  CAUSATION 
The central  task of the empirical  work is to estimate  an equation  in 
which  the growth  rate  of the money  supply  is the dependent  variable,  and 
the set of independent  variables  includes  those claimed  above  to be pos- 
sible determinants  of central-bank  behavior.  In addition  to the money 
equation,  equations  with the growth  rates  of wages  and prices  as alterna- 
tive dependent  variables  are estimated,  in order to assess the role of 
autonomous  wage push as a source of inflation.  Table 1 lays out the 
expected  pattern  of signs on coefficients  in equations  explaining  the be- 
havior  of the money  supply  and domestic  wages,  according  to the various 
subhypotheses. 
22. Assar Lindbeck, "Stabilization  Policy in Open Economies with Endogenous 
Politicians," American Economic Review, vol. 66 (May  1976), pp. 1-19.  See also 
William D. Nordhaus, "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, 
vol. 42 (April 1975), pp. 169-90. 
23.  Another factor, emphasized by  Nordhaus, Lindbeck, and  others, is  the 
timing of elections. Although political dummy variables are included in the money 
equations estimated below, space limitations require that a full consideration  of the 
political hypothesis  be postponed  for another  paper. o  b  0 
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For instance,  the first column  lists the pattern  of signs in the money 
equation predicted  by the international-monetarist  view. Consider  the 
response  of the economy  to a foreign  demand  shock, the type of event 
that the international-monetarist  approach  blames for the worldwide 
acceleration  of inflation  in the late 1960s and  early  1970s. Higher  foreign 
demand stimulates  both higher domestic output and higher tradable- 
goods prices. The simultaneous  increase in reserves  is partly a direct 
result of the trade surplus, and partly an indirect  result of the higher 
demand for money induced by both the price and output effects. A 
money-supply  equation  should  exhibit  positive  signs  on current  or lagged 
determinants  of money  demand,  particularly  domestic  prices  and output. 
Because  of the focus here on the aftereffects  of autonomous  wage move- 
ments,  the domestic  price index is proxied  in table 1 by the combination 
of tradable-goods  prices and domestic  wages. The role of international 
reserves  is to identify  the effect on money-supply  growth  of shifts  in the 
demand  for money caused by factors other than tradable-goods  prices 
and domestic  output  and wages.  The absence  of a positive  sign on inter- 
national  reserves  in the money  equation  suggests  the possibility  that cen- 
tral  banks  succeed  in varying  their  domestic  assets  to offset  reserve  flows 
and thus manage  to sterilize  some shifts in the demand  for money.  This 
would  tend  to deny  that  the supply  of money  is determined  exclusively  by 
the  demand  for money. 
A positive  sign on international  reserves  is consistent  not only  with the 
international-monetarist  approach,  but also with the countercyclical-ac- 
tivist view that an inflow  of reserves  allows a central  bank to pursue  its 
domestic  price and output objectives  in a more expansionary  direction 
than would be possible if reserves  were being lost. The countercyclical 
activists  (column  5) would  also expect  that  an increase  in the growth  rate 
of real output  should  lead to a reduction  in the growth  rate  of the money 
supply.  As for the variables  reflecting  nominal  wages  and tradable-goods 
prices,  the coefficient  in the money-growth  equation  can be positive  but 
should  be significantly  smaller  than  unity (so that a wage  or price  acceler- 
ation  is allowed  to cut the level of real  balances). 
Some interpreters,  particularly  those identified  with the international- 
monetarist  camp, have tested a restrictive  version  of the wage-push  ap- 
proach  which requires  wage behavior  to be entirely  independent  of any 
macroeconomic  variables.  A broader  view is that autonomous  forces are 
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prices, domestic output, and monetary  growth. Two versions of  this 
broader  wage-push  approach  are listed in separate  columns  in table 1: 
a wage push that is subsequently  accommodated  by the central bank 
(column  7), and  a wage  push  that  is not accommodated  (column  8). The 
positive  signs  on line 7 in columns  7 and 8 represent  the crucial  autono- 
mous  wage-push  effect.  Since  this autonomous  influence  is denied  by most 
adherents  to the  international-monetarist  view,  a zero  coefficient  is entered 
in column  6 on line 7. 
But evidence  of an autonomous  wage push, in the form of significant 
positive coefficients  on appropriate  dummy  variables  in the wage equa- 
tion, is not sufficient  to validate  the wage-push  approach  as a theory  of 
inflation.  First, the higher  level of wage rates may cause a squeeze on 
profits  rather  than an increase  in prices.  This possibility  may be greatest 
for a small, open economy and may result if the central  bank does not 
provide  the money to accommodate  the wage increase.  It is treated  as a 
separate  subhypothesis  regarding  the money equation  in table 1 in the 
column  reflecting  wage  push  without  monetary  accommodation  (compare 
columns  2 and 3). Not only is the coefficient  on wage  rates  in the money 
equation  equal to zero (line 2),  but for consistency  the money supply 
should  not respond  to increases  in tradable-goods  prices  either  (line 4).24 
Shifts  in domestic  demand  may  lead to monetary  accommodation  if the 
central  bank  is attempting  to stabilize  interest  rates.  While  private  shifts  in 
the IS curve are difficult  to measure  empirically,  it is possible  to include 
an estimate  of the full-employment  fiscal  deficit  as an additional  variable 
in the money  equation,  with a sign  expected  to be positive  if deficit  financ- 
ing has contributed  to episodes  of monetary  acceleration,  as in column  4. 
The overview  in table 1 suggests  that distinguishing  the international- 
monetarist  view from the subhypothesis  of wage-push  with monetary  ac- 
commodation  may  be rather  difficult.  Joint  feedback  between  money  and 
wage rates  is admissible  under  either  approach,  as indicated  by the posi- 
tive coefficients  on wages in the money equation  and money  in the wage 
equation.  Nevertheless,  the signs  on coefficients  in table 1 indicate  that  the 
framework  can  still  yield  interesting  conclusions: 
1. Zero coefficients  on international  reserves  in the money equation 
would  tend  to raise  the probability  that  central  banks  were  able  to sterilize 
24.  Since consistency is not a necessary feature of the policies of columns 2 and 
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changes  in the demand  for money that attracted  reserves,  suggesting  ex- 
ceptions to the international-monetarist  assumption  that the domestic 
money  supply  is determined  exclusively  by the demand  for money. 
2.  Zero  coefficients  on dummy  variables  in wage equations  in periods 
when  wage  push  is alleged  to have occurred  would tend to deny  the rele- 
vance  of the wage-push  hypothesis  and  to confirm  the negative  verdict  of 
previous  empirical  tests  of that  view produced  by the international-mone- 
tarist  camp. 
3. Nonpositive coefficients  on wage rates in  the money equation, 
together  with  positive  wage-push  dummy  coefficients,  would tend  to indi- 
cate that any episodes  of wage  push  were  not accommodated,  a view that 
is consistent  with  columns  3 and 8 of table 1. 
4.  Negative  coefficients  in the money  equation  on domestic  output,  or 
positive coefficients  below unity on wages and tradable-goods  prices, 
would  tend  to confirm  the countercyclical-reaction  approach  and provide 
evidence  against  destabilizing  accommodation. 
5. Positive coefficients  on the full-employment  deficit  would tend to 
confirm  the deficit-finance  subhypothesis  without denying any of the 
others. 
The pattern  of signs  in table 1 can be viewed  from a broader  perspec- 
tive. First, the money equation  provides  a test of whether  changes  in the 
money supply  are truly exogenous,  dependent  only on the fixed aims of 
the central  bank,  or the central  bank  reacts  systematically  to events  in the 
economy  (in which  case econometric  equations  that  treat  the money  sup- 
ply as exogenous  yield  biased  coefficients).  Both  international  monetarists 
and wage-push  proponents  expect that the monetary  authorities  will be- 
have passively,  allowing  an acceleration  in monetary  growth  in response 
to a higher  demand  for money,  whereas  those  who view the authorities  as 
a central  component  of an activist  stabilization  policy  hope that  negative 
coefficients  will emerge  on the output  ratio  and  zero or small  positive  co- 
efficients  will be attached  to changes  in nominal  wages  and  tradable-goods 
prices. 
TESTS  FOR  EXOGENEITY  AND  FEEDBACK 
Empirical  testing  requires  attention  both to the signs  of coefficients  and 
to timing  relationships.  In an  influential  article  Christopher  Sims  proposed 
testing  for patterns  of feedback  between a pair of variables  by running 424  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1977 
two regressions,  with each as dependent  variable  and both leading and 
lagged values of the other as independent  variables.25  Significant  coeff- 
cients on the leading  values of a right-hand  variable  indicate that it is 
endogenous,  influenced  by feedback  from  the  left-hand  variable. 
A second method, which was originally  proposed by Granger  and 
which Sims has recently  implemented  for the United States and West 
Germany,  also involves  estimation  of a separate  equation  for each endog- 
enous variable  but substitutes  lagged values of the dependent  variable 
for leading  values  of the independent  variables.26  Now a dependent  vari- 
able is identified  as exogenous  if the coefficients  on all the current  and 
lagged values of the independent  variables  in its equation  are zero. A 
separate  equation  is estimated  for each variable  of interest.  For instance, 
the hypothesis  that the money supply is truly exogenous, and not de- 
termined  by feedback  from any of the economic  variables  listed in table 
1, would require  that all of the coefficients  on current  and lagged  values 
of those variables  be insignificantly  different  from zero in an equation 
with money as the dependent  variable.  Because all variables  of interest 
are included  on the right-hand  side of each equation,  some are bound  to 
be endogenous.  Once it is determined  that a variable,  say money,  is sub- 
ject to feedback  because  some right-hand  coefficients  in its equation  are 
nonzero,  it then  becomes  possible  that the coefficients  on money  in other 
equations  are  biased.  This  limitation  must  be recognized  in interpretations 
of individual  coefficients  in the  regression  results  presented  below. 
Several  factors  lead to the choice of the second  method  in this paper. 
First,  the inclusion  of lagged  dependent  variables  allows  serial  correlation 
to be purged,  in contrast  to the disadvantages  of the arbitrary  "prefilter- 
ing" performed  by Sims in his oft-cited  use of the first  method.  Second, 
the first  method  is extremely  clumsy  to use in multivariate  applications, 
since both leading and lagging terms must be included for each inde- 
pendent  variable;  as a result,  degrees  of freedom  are rapidly  exhausted. 
Third,  equations  with  leading  variables  cannot  be subjected  to postsample 
extrapolation  experiments,  which are often of interest  to determine  how 
well a given set of current  and lagged right-hand  variables  account  for 
25.  Christopher  A. Sims, "Money, Income, and Causality,"  American Economic 
Review, vol. 62 (September 1972), pp. 540-52. 
26. See C. W. J. Granger, "Investigating  Causal Relations by Econometric Mod- 
els and Cross-Spectral  Methods," Econometrica, vol. 37  (July 1969),  pp. 424-38. 
Sims'  recent  work is not yet available  for distribution. Robert  J. Gordon  425 
movements  of a dependent  variable after the end of a given sample 
period.27 
To control  its length,  the paper  contains  equations  for only three de- 
pendent  variables  for  each  country,  the nominal  money  supply,  wage  rates, 
and the deflator  for gross  national  product  (or gross domestic  product), 
all expressed  as quarterly  rates of change. Primary  emphasis  is placed 
on the money  and wage equations.  A price  equation  is estimated  only to 
examine  the extent to which domestic  prices responded  during alleged 
episodes  of wage  push.28 
DETAILED  SPECIFICATIONS 
The  equation  specifications  have  several  important  features.29 
1. In light of recent evidence that U.S. wage behavior can be ex- 
plained  as well by the gap between  actual (Q)  and potential (Q*)  real 
GNP as byvarious  unemployment  concepts,  I decided  to use a single  vari- 
able,  the "output  ratio"  (Q/Q*),  as a proxy  for the effects  of real output 
and labor-market  conditions  in the money, wage, and price equations.-0 
Because  the level of money should  be related  to the level of Q/Q*, the 
equation  for the rate  of change  of money  uses as an independent  variable 
the rate of change  of Q/Q*. On the other  hand,  the traditional  Phillips- 
curve  hypothesis  postulates  that  the rate  of change  of wage rates  depends 
on the level of excess  labor  demand,  so the level of Q/Q* was used  in the 
equations  for the  wage  rate  and  the  price  deflator. 
2.  There is no reason that an "automatic  stabilizer"  increase  in the 
fiscal deficit  caused  by a recession  should  put pressure  on the monetary 
authority.  Thus as a proxy for the full-employment  deficit, the fiscal- 
27. I am grateful to Robert Hall for urging me to switch to the second method 
after a preliminary  bout with the leading-variable  technique. 
28. The price equation includes two sets of current and lagged wage variables: 
(1)  the contribution of the dummy variables in the wage equation, and (2)  wage 
change minus the dummy contribution.  If the two sets of coefficients are identical, 
then all wage changes alter prices in the same way, whereas a zero coefficient  on the 
dummy contribution  would indicate that the autonomous wage movements  identified 
by the dummy  variables  did not influence  price  change at all. 
29.  Readers are referred to the data appendix, available from the author on re- 
quest, for a detailed account of the construction  of the data file developed for this 
project. 
30. Robert J. Gordon, "Can the Inflation of the 1970s Be Explained?"  BPEA, 
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deficit variable  that is entered  into the money equations  is the residual 
from a separate  equation  (not exhibited  below) that explains  the actual 
fiscal deficit  as a function  of a constant,  seasonal  dummies,  and current 
and  lagged  real  GNP. 
3. The "basic equations"  are uniformly estimated for the sample 
period 1958:3 to 1973:1. The first  quarter  is determined  by the need to 
include  lagged  variables  and by the 1957:1 starting  date of the data  file. 
The last quarter  marks  the initiation  of the system  of flexible  exchange 
rates.  Interesting  features  of the 1973-76 interval  are identified  both by 
examination  of the residuals  of a postsample  extrapolation,  and  by reesti- 
mation  of an auxiliary  equation  for the full 1958:3-1976:4 period.  Shifts 
in coefficients  between  the basic and auxiliary  equations  can be examined 
for evidence  of changes  in structure  in the period  of flexible  rates. 
4.  The auxiliary  equations  for the rate  of change  of the money  supply 
all include as an additional  variable  the rate of change  of the exchange 
rate between  each country  and the U.S. dollar, entered  in the form of a 
multiplicative  dummy  equal to zero through  1973:1 and to itself there- 
after. 
5. Four lagged dependent  and independent  variables  are included  in 
the wage and price equations, and three lagged dependent  and inde- 
pendent  variables  are  included  in the money  equations. 
6.  For most countries  the dependent  variable  in the money equation 
is M1.  Early  investigations  pointed  to massive  shifts  between  demand  and 
time deposits  in Canada  and France  in 1967-68 as a result of banking 
reforms,  and  so M2  was  used  for these  two countries. 
7.  Preliminary  results  indicated  that  the coefficient  on international  re- 
serves  in the money  equation  should  be allowed  to shift  at least once dur- 
ing the sample  period.  Thus  separate  coefficients  on reserves  are  estimated 
in the money  equations  for 1958:3-1965:4 and 1966:1-1973:1, as well 
as for 1973:2-1976:4 in the auxiliary  equations.  The breaks  for Canada 
are 1962:2 and 1970:2, corresponding  to the end of the first  experiment 
with  flexible  rates  and  the beginning  of the second. 
THE  ROLE  OF DUMMY  VARIABLES 
The use of dummy  variables  in the empirical  results  may require  justi- 
fication.  The practice  is generally  accepted as legitimate  when some a 
priori  reason suggests  treating  a particular  period as unique.  But it can Robert  J. Gordon  427 
be questioned  when  the choice of time periods  is arbitrary  or based on a 
preliminary  "peek"  at the data. By this criterion  the use of seasonal 
dummy  variables  in all equations  qualifies  on the a priori  criterion,  but 
the wage-push  dummies  cannot  enter  any such  plea of innocence.  Even if 
particular  events  that  might  have caused  a wage push  can be identified- 
for example,  the Italian  "hot autumn"  of 1969-there  is no a priori  cri- 
terion  to determine  how long the effect  on wage rates  might  have lasted. 
With simultaneous,  centralized,  nationwide  bargaining,  the entire effect 
might  occur in one quarter.  With other  bargaining  mechanisms,  it could 
be spread  over  several  quarters. 
Because the precise  timing  of the wage-push  dummies  in some cases 
was of necessity  determined  by "peeking"  at the data,  separate  versions  of 
the wage equations  with and without the wage-push  dummies  are ex- 
hibited. Although some readers  might have preferred  that the use of 
wage-push  dummies  be replaced  by a detailed  examination  and  discussion 
of individual  residuals,  this approach  was rejected  in order  to avoid  bias- 
ing other  coefficients  in an equation  in which  "true"  specification  involves 
dummies.  In fact, the inclusion  of dummy  variables  does generally  alter 
the coefficients  on other  variables  in the wage equations  presented  below. 
STRIKING  FEATURES  OF  THE  BASIC  DATA 
Figure 1 displays  four-quarter  overlapping  rates of change  of money, 
wage rates, and the price deflator  for the United States,  for a weighted 
average  of the Other  Seven, and for the World,  consisting  of the United 
States  and  the Other  Seven.31  The most striking  aspect  of the figure  is the 
difference  between the international-monetarist  parable and the actual 
behavior  of the average  for the World and for the Other Seven. There 
appears  to be only a very loose relation  between  World  wage and  mone- 
tary  changes  between  1958 and  the end of 1972. The rate  of wage  change 
was essentially  constant  between  1960 and 1966, and  showed  no response 
to the temporary  acceleration  of money in 1963-66. Further,  monetary 
behavior  appears  able to explain  little of the doubling of wage  change  be- 
tween late 1967 and mid-1970, since the average  rate of money growth 
during  1967-69  (7.1 percent) differed  little from that in 1963-66  (6.8 
percent). On the other  hand,  the lead of wage  change  relative  to the mon- 
etary  acceleration  of 1970-71 suggests  that  at least  part  of the  behavior  of 
31. The weights are current  shares  of real GNP in U.S. dollars. 0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.  0 
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Table  2. Coefficients  and t Statistics  from Two-Way  Regressions  on World  Money 
and Wages,  and  on World  Money  and Pricesa 
Independent  variable 
Lag on independent  Money  in  Money  in  Wage  in  Price in 
variable  and  wage  price  money  money 
regression  statistic  equation  equation  equation  equation 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Lag 
Current  period  -0.043  0.016  -0.371  0.197 
(-0.87)  (0.38)  (-0.87)  (0.38) 
One period  -0.034  0.050  -0.331  -0.875 
(-0.68)  (1.36)  (-0.71)  (-1.60) 
Two period  0.009  0.043  0.770  -0.647 
(0.16)  (1.06)  (1.58)  (-1.35) 
Three  period  0.001  0.006  1.683  0.588 
(0.01)  (0.15)  (3.52)  (1.12) 
Four period  -0.036  0.055  -0.876  1.834 
(-0.85)  (1.48)  (-1.66)  (3.47) 
Regressionz  statistic 
Sum of coefficients  -0.103  0.170  0.873  1.097 
(-0.98)  (1.95)  (0.82)  (0.95) 
Standard  error  (percent)  0.266  0.229  0.777  0.808 
Sources: See discussion in text. 
a.  All variables are one-quarter  percent changes. All equations include in addition a constant term, three 
seasonal dunmuy  variables, and four lagged values of  the dependent variable. The sample period for all 
regressions  in this table is 1958:3-1973:1. 
money in this period might be explained  by passive accommodation  to 
wage  change. 
Although  the primary  focus of this study  is on chains  of causation  and 
timing relationships  between money and wages in the eight individual 
countries,  table 2 displays  the results  of simple  regressions  relating  wage, 
price,  and  monetary  rates  of change.  As in all regressions  estimated  in this 
paper,  four lagged  values of the dependent  variable  are included,  so the 
dependent  variable  is considered  exogenous and influenced  only by its 
own past values  if the coefficients  on all of the independent  variables  are 
zero. 
Table  2 explores  the  international-monetarist  contention  that  the world 
inflation  rate depends  on previous  values of world monetary  growth.  In 
fact, only in the price equation  (column 2)  is the sum of money coeffi- 
cients  statistically  significant,  although  the sum  of coefficients  is much  too 
small to be consistent  with the long-run  neutrality  of world monetary 
change.  But the results  in column 1 do not appear  at all consistent  with a Robert  J. Gordon  431 
monetary  explanation  of wage behavior.  Moreover,  although  the sum of 
coefficients  on wages and prices in the two money equations  is insignifi- 
cant  in columns  3 and  4, it is quite  large,  and  one coefficient  in each equa- 
tion is very strongly  positive. Thus the exogeneity  of the world rate of 
monetary  growth  is not strongly  supported,  and the possibility  is sug- 
gested that exogenous wage movements generated passive monetary 
accommodation. 
Another  interesting  feature  of figure  1 is the divergence  of monetary- 
growth  rates  in the United  States  and the Other  Seven.  While  the growth 
rate of money accelerated  in the United States  between 1962 and early 
1969, that in the Other  Seven decelerated  between  late 1963 and early 
1970. And though  the explosive  period  of monetary  growth  in the Other 
Seven  between  late 1970 and early 1973 does correspond  to a period  of 
relatively  rapid  U.S. monetary  growth,  the previous  period of accelera- 
tion in the United States  during  1967-69 was accompanied  by relatively 
low monetary  growth  rates  in the Other  Seven.  Again this pattern  is con- 
sistent  with the hypothesis  that the United  States  was not the sole engine 
of world monetary  growth,  and that domestic  wage behavior  within  the 
Other  Seven  played  some  role in the 1970-71 monetary  acceleration. 
Summary  of Basic  Results 
The signs and significance  of several of the more interesting  coeffi- 
cients in wage and money equations  for individual  countries and the 
aggregate  for the Other  Seven  are  listed  in table  3. The  table  starts  with  the 
United States and the weighted average  of the Other Seven, and con- 
tinues  with the results  for each of the Other  Seven countries.  The signs 
(+,  0, or -)  refer  to the sums  of coefficients  of the independent  variables, 
and the superscripts  a and b indicate  statistical  significance  (using a one- 
tailed  test) at the 10 percent  and  5 percent  level, respectively.  A sign  with- 
out a superscript  stands at only the bare margin  of significance,  the 20 
percent  confidence  level. 
WAGE-PUSH,  INTERNATIONAL  RESERVES, 
AND  MONETARY  ACCOMMODATION 
The basic  message  of the results  is that,  while no simple  subhypothesis 
accurately  describes  the behavior of money and inflation  in all of the V-4 
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eight  countries,  nevertheless  the international  monetarists  fare  better  than 
the wage-push  group. The coefficient  on international  reserves in the 
second  half  of the sample  period  in the  money  equation  (1966:1-1973: 1) 
is strongly  positive  in three of the important  countries,  West Germany, 
Japan, and the United Kingdom,  indicating  that central  banks in these 
countries  were unable completely  to sterilize  shifts in money demand. 
Furthermore,  in each of these three countries  (as well as in the United 
States  and  France) money  has a positive  influence  on the behavior  of the 
wage  rate.  The explosion  of growth  in world  reserves  during  the 1970-72 
interval  thus appears  to have contributed  to an acceleration  of growth  in 
the money  supply  and  indirectly  to an acceleration  of wage  growth. 
The wage-push  hypothesis  appears  to be alive and well as an explana- 
tion of wage  rates,  but not as a theory  of inflation  or of monetary  growth. 
Large  positive  coefficients  on wage-push  dummy  variables  emerge  in the 
price equation  for various periods in the Other Seven average,  and in 
France, West Germany,  Italy, Sweden,  and the United Kingdom  taken 
separately.  The inflationary  impact  of the autonomous  wage  movements  is 
measured  in a price equation  that contains  two wage variables  (each en- 
tered  as a current  value and four  lags): first,  the actual  rate  of change  of 
wages  minus  the contribution  of the dummy  variables  in the wage equa- 
tion, and second, the contribution  of the dummy  variables  themselves. 
For the Other  Seven  as a group,  the coefficient  on the  dummy  contribution 
is close to zero, as compared  with  a coefficient  on "normal"  wage  changes 
of close to unity. Only in the United Kingdom  is the coefficient  on the 
dummy  contribution  not only as large as the normal  coefficient,  but also 
statistically  significant.  In France,  West Germany,  Italy, and Sweden,  the 
coefficient  on the dummy  contribution  is larger  than  the normal  one. 
How can the generally  small values of the sum of wage coefficients 
in the money equations  be reconciled  with the appearance  of feedback 
from  wages to money  in the equation  for the world as a whole (table 2, 
column 3)? The world response  lies between  the small response  of the 
Other  Seven and the large  sum of coefficients  for the United  States.  Thus 
passive monetary  accommodation  in the world appears  to have been 
centered  in the very country  that exhibits  no sign whatsoever  of autono- 
mous wage push. Only in the United Kingdom  do the results  display  all 
of the ingredients  required  for wage  push to be a valid theory  not only of 
wages  but also of continuing  inflation;  but, as discussed  below, even this 
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push in the United  Kingdom  was not autonomous  at all, but rather  ap- 
pears  to have  been  a postcontrols  rebound. 
In general,  the behavior  of monetary  authorities  in different  countries 
has little in common,  and no single subhypothesis  receives strong  con- 
firmation.  The Japanese  appear  to be inconsistent,  pursuing  a counter- 
cyclical  policy relative  to the output  business  cycle while simultaneously 
accommodating  fiscal deficits.  The Japanese  money supply  reacted  posi- 
tively  to inflows  of reserves,  a result  consistent  with  both  the  international- 
monetarist and  countercyclical-activist  approaches. Sweden exhibits 
countercyclical  behavior,  while money in Italy and Britain appears  to 
fluctuate  procyclically.  Both the Germans  and the Canadians  are incon- 
sistent,  resisting  higher  prices of traded  goods but allowing  the growth 
rate  of the money  supply  to rise  in response  to higher  wage rates.  A posi- 
tive coefficient  on a nominal variable does not indicate destabilizing 
behavior  in the money equation  unless its value exceeds unity; by this 
criterion  only the United  States  and Sweden  (and the United  Kingdom  in 
the extended  sample  period) exhibit  a destabilizing  response  of money  to 
wage  change. 
In several  countries  the intemational-monetarist  case is bolstered  by 
the significantly  positive  coefficients  on money  in the wage equation.  Yet 
the results  summarized  in table 3 understate  the monetary  effect,  because 
some of the procyclical  correlation  of money and wages  is soaked  up by 
the output-ratio  variable. When the output ratio is omitted from the 
basic wage equation, the money coefficients  become larger in several 
countries.2 This result denies the extreme  wage-push  view that wage 
32. The money coefficients and t ratios (in parentheses), with and without the 
output-ratio  variable,  are as follows: 
With  output  Without  output 
United States  0.258  (3.04)  0.327  (4.15) 
Other  Seven  0.209  (1.58)  0.156  (1.11) 
Canada  -0.049(-0.43)  0.019  (0.17) 
France  0.593  (2.61)  0.526  (2.48) 
West Germany  0.430  (1.36)  0.702  (2.52) 
Italy  0.179  (0.77)  0.212  (0.94) 
Japan  0.172  (1.12)  0.171  (1.00) 
Sweden  -0.260(-1.99)  -0.024(-0.22) 
United Kingdom  0.652  (2.89)  0.706  (3.55) 
The decline in the coefficient  for the Other Seven is puzzling, in light of the increase 
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claims are "picked  out of the air"  and are totally  independent  of market 
forces,  but is consistent  with a more  eclectic  view that  both market  forces 
and  autonomous  "push"  episodes  matter  for wage  behavior. 
Detailed  Results  by Country 
Tables  4 through  12, grouped  together  at the end of the paper  for easy 
reference,  present  the detailed empirical  results. There is one table for 
each country,  and one for the aggregate  of the Other  Seven.  The first  two 
columns  of each table present  equations  in which the quarterly  rate of 
change  in the money supply  is the dependent  variable,  with the shorter 
sample period through 1973:1 in column 1 and the extended period 
through  1976:4 in column  2. The next three columns  present  wage-rate 
equations,  with the short sample period in column 3, and with control 
and  wage-push  dummy  variables  added  in column  4 for the short  period, 
and in column 5 for the extended  period. Finally, a single equation  for 
price change is presented in column 6. 
THE  UNITED  STATES 
A vast amount of empirical  work on "St. Louis equations"  in the 
United States has treated the rate of growth of the money supply as 
exogenous  in equations  explaining  the growth of nominal GNP. Sims' 
paper confirms  the exogeneity  of money in a simple bivariate  test on 
the money supply and nominal  income.34  This result appears  to be re- 
peated  in column 1 of table 4 for the United States,  in the sense that no 
sum of coefficients  on any independent  variable  is significant,  even at the 
10 percent  level. On the other  hand, the sum of coefficients  on the wage 
rate is very large, and one of the individual  coefficients  has a t ratio of 
3.6. A Tinbergen  analysis indicates that the wage variable does con- 
tribute almost all of the explanation  of the acceleration  of monetary 
growth  in 1964-68.35  It is the zigzag  plus-minus  pattern  of the wage  coeffi- 
cients that reduces  the significance  of the sum of coefficients,  suggesting 
33. The set-up of table 6, for Canada, is slightly different  because no wage equa- 
tions with dummy variables for the 1958-73 period were estimated  for that country. 
34. Sims, "Money,  Income, and Causality,"  p. 547. 
35.  The contribution  of the wage terms rises from an average  of 1.23 percent per 
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that monetary  growth responded  in this period to the acceleration  of 
wage growth, and less to the rate of growth of wages by itself.86 
The most  interesting  features  of the U.S. wage  equations  are  the strong 
role of money  and  of dummy  variables  for guidepost  and  restraint  periods. 
The significant  negative  coefficients  on the guidepost  dummies  confirm 
earlier  results,  of Perry  and others,  and so does the pattern  of the other 
dummy  variables  in general.  When the effects  of all three dummies  for 
the 1971-75 period  in the extended  wage  equation  in column  5 are  cumu- 
lated, the sum of 0.18 percent indicates that the rebound more than 
canceled  the mild restraining  influence  of the controls.  The bottom line 
in the table  lists the postsample  cumulative  extrapolation  errors  for three 
of the equations.  These errors  are remarkably  small,  both relative  to my 
previous  work on "structural"  wage and price equations,  and compared 
to the results  for some of the other  countries. 
THE  OTHER  SEVEN 
The money  supply  in the Other  Seven  appears  to have  been exogenous, 
with no significant  sum of  coefficients  on  any independent  variable. 
Despite the positive coefficients  on international  reserves  in the money 
equations  of several important  countries,  the money equation for the 
Other  Seven  bases its explanation  of the 1970-73 money explosion (see 
figure  1  )  on a lagged response  to changes  in wage rates and tradable- 
goods prices.  This in turn  leads to horrendous  postsample  extrapolation 
errors,  as the equation  predicts  huge  rates  of monetary  growth,  of 25 to 30 
percent  in 1974-75, in response  to the 1974 acceleration  in wage rates 
and tradable-goods  prices. The large positive coefficient  on the fiscal 
deficit  also leads to an expectation  of rapid  monetary  growth,  in contrast 
to the  deceleration  that  actually  occurred. 
The wage and  price  equations  in the Other  Seven  are more  reasonable 
and  interesting.  As in the United  States,  money  and dummy  variables  play 
a relatively  strong  role, although  here  most  of the significant  dummy  vari- 
ables have positive coefficients  which support  the wage-push  subhypo- 
thesis, rather  than the predominantly  negative  coefficients  observed  for 
the United  States.  It is important  to note that the significance  of money 
36. The coefficient  on the fourth lag is strongly negative. The sum of coefficients 
on the current  value and first three lags is 3.87 with a I ratio of 2.53. Figure 1 reveals 
the lead of wages relative to money in late 1965, and the contemporaneous  move- 
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in the wage equation  for both the United States and the Other Seven 
evaporates  if the dummy  variables  are omitted (column 3).  Thus one 
cannot  claim  both  that  dummy  variables  are  unimportant  or inappropriate 
and that money  is an important  determinant  of wage change.  The tradi- 
tional  Phillips-curve  effect,  in the form of a positive  relation  between  the 
rate  of change  of wages and the level of the output  ratio, shows  up more 
strongly  for the Other Seven than for the United States in column 4. 
Traded-goods  prices also are more  important,  as would be expected. 
The wage-push  dummy  variables  are chosen for the same periods as 
in the major  individual  countries  and  are  significant  on lines 10c and 10d. 
But this lends little support  to the wage-push  hypothesis,  because  there 
appears  to have been no significant  positive  impact  of these autonomous 
episodes  of wage change  on the price  deflator,  or of wage  rates  in general 
on the money supply. The relatively  strong  positive impact of money- 
supply  growth  on wages supports  the international  monetarists.  But the 
direct  effect  of money  on prices  is negative.  Combining  the estimated  role 
of money  in the wage and price equations  for the Other  Seven indicates 
that  more  than  half of the impact  of money  on wage  change  does not feed 
through  to price  change. 
CANADA 
The Canadian  money equations  differ  from the others  by splitting  the 
reserves  variable  according  to the dates when Canada  terminated  and 
reinstated  floating  exchange  rates, and also by including  the exchange 
rate as a variable  throughout  the sample  period.  Further,  in light of pre- 
vious results  and  the overall  domination  of the Canadian  economy  by the 
United  States,  each Canadian  equation  includes  as an independent  vari- 
able the corresponding  quantity  in the United States.87  The results  yield 
few significant  coefficients  that  would  deny  the exogeneity  of the Canadian 
money supply. The influence  of the U.S. money supply is surprisingly 
weak in light of the common  periods  of monetary  restriction  in the two 
countries  m 1959-60, 1969-70, and  1974. 
No dummy  variables  are included in the basic Canadian  wage and 
price equations.  U.S. wages and  prices  have relatively  weak effects  in the 
expected  direction.  In the extended  wage  equation  through  1976 (column 
37. See, for instance, Spitiller, "Semi-Annual  Wage Equations for the Manufac- 
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4),  a dummy  variable  is included  for the Canadian  policy of wage and 
price restraints  announced  in October 1975. The equation,  which relies 
on the U.S. wage  and  traded-goods  prices  for almost  all of its explanation 
of Canadian  wage  behavior,  attaches  a strongly  positive  coefficient  to this 
dummy  variable.  This  perverse  result  apparently  identifies  the acceleration 
of wages in Canada  relative  to the United States that prompted  the re- 
straint  program  rather  than the positive effects,  if any, that the program 
had. 
FRANCE 
France  appears  to have pursued  a relatively  countercyclical  monetary 
policy. The negative  sums of coefficients  on the output  ratio and traded- 
goods prices tend to confirm  the OECD narrative  of phases of French 
monetary  policy which attributes  restrictive  measures  introduced  in 1963 
and  late 1968 to a reaction  to the acceleration  of inflation  in those  periods. 
Partially  offsetting  this verdict is a relatively  large, albeit insignificant, 
sum  of coefficients  on wage  rates.  An inspection  of the data  indicates  that 
the mid-1968 episode  of autonomous  wage increase  was initially  accom- 
modated,  but that within six months monetary  policy had shifted to a 
stance  of restriction. 
Another interesting  feature of  the French money equation is  the 
absence  of any accommodation  of reserve  inflows.  The expected  positive 
correlation  between  money  and  international  reserves  in 1971-72 is offset 
by a dramatic  negative  correlation  in 1968-70, when  the initial  monetary 
accommodation  of the 1968 wage push caused  massive  reserve  outflows, 
followed  by a devaluation  in August 1969, a period  of tight  money,  and a 
reserve  inflow.  Another  factor breaking  the positive  correlation  between 
reserves  and money was the mild restriction  and a deceleration  in mon- 
etary growth  achieved  by the French  in late 1971, the period of maxi- 
mum  accumulation  of reserves.38 
The wage equation  of column  4 introduces  two dummy  variables,  the 
second  of which  reduces  the standard  error  of the equation.  The restraint 
dummy  refers  to the eight quarters  of 1964 and 1965, when a mild form 
of incomes  policy was in effect.39  The wage-push  dummy  is in effect in 
3  8. This restrictive  reaction to the capital inflow is noted in Organisation  for Eco- 
nomic Co-operation  and Development,  Monetary  Policy in France, Monetary  Studies 
Series (Paris: OECD, 1974), p. 46. 
39. Lloyd Ulman and Robert J. Flanagan, Wage Restraint:  A Study of Incomes 
Policies in Western  Europe (University of California Press, 1971), pp. 161-63. Robert  J. Gordon  439 
1968:2 and 1968:3 and  reflects  the impact  of the June 1968 Protocole de 
Grenelle  which  resulted  in a nominal  wage increase  of 11 to 13 percent 
in manufacturing  in the aftermath  of the May  general  strike. 
The price equation  tends to support  the wage-push  approach,  since 
the contribution  of the dummy-variable  coefficients  to price change  was 
even greater  than that of "normal"  wage increases.  But the wage-push 
episode  did not lead to a continuing  inflation  because  the final  ingredient 
required  for that development-a  continuing accommodation  by the 
central  bank-was  not present.  By early 1969 the net influence  of the 
countercyclical  coefficients  in the money  equation-not just the negative 
coefficients  on traded-goods  prices  and  the output  ratio,  but also the posi- 
tive coefficient  on reserves-had  swamped  the influence  of the positive 
coefficient  on wages. 
WEST  GERMANY 
The standard  explanation  of the explosion  in German  monetary  growth 
between 1970:4  and 1973:1 is the flood of  dollar reserves into the 
Bundesbank  beginning  in early 1970; and the advent  of the flexible-rate 
system  is usually  cited as the factor  that allowed  the Germans  to "regain 
control"  of their  money supply  in early 1973. Indeed,  the statistical  sig- 
nificance  of the second  reserves  variable  is greater  in the German  money 
equation  (table 8, column  1, line 8b) than  it is for any  other  country.  But 
an inspection  of the other coefficients  suggests  that the story of German 
monetary  movements  is more complex than the simple international- 
monetarist  story about a helplessly  passive central  banker  drowning  in 
dollars.  Explaining  the total  acceleration  in the  four-quarter  rate  of change 
of money from 5.77 percent  in 1970:3 to 13.41 percent  in 1971:3, the 
equation  assigns  almost  as much responsibility  to the 1969-70 wage ac- 
celeration  as to the 1970-71 inflow  of reserves.40  This single episode  of 
monetary  accommodation  stands  in sharp  contrast  to the evidence  that 
during  most of the rest of the sample  period  the central  bank operated 
according  to a simple countercyclical  reaction  function,  inaugurating  a 
restrictive  policy  when  the inflation  rate  began  to accelerate.  The equation 
picks up this countercyclical  behavior  by assigning  a large negative  co- 
efficient  to the change  in traded-goods  prices,  which  makes  a substantial 
40.  Over the same period the contribution  of the wage terms to the four-quarter 
rate of  change of money rises by 5.23 percent, and of the reserve terms by 6.72 
percent. Since this overexplains  the actual acceleration,  the contribution  of the other 
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negative  contribution  in each  of the phases  labeled  as "restrictive"  by the 
OECD (1959-60, 1965-66, and 1969-70).4' 
The large  underprediction  in the postsample  extrapolation  of the Ger- 
man money  equation  is a less extreme  version  of the Canadian  problem; 
when a negative  coefficient  is assigned  to the change  in tradable-goods 
prices,  a large negative  growth  rate of money is predicted  in 1974. The 
extended  money equation  exhibits  substantial  shifts in coefficients  as it 
struggles  to explain  the 1974 experience,  providing  evidence  of a struc- 
tural  shift in German  monetary  policy when the era of flexible  exchange 
rates  began  in early  1973. 
Two dummy  variables  are included in the German  wage and price 
equations.  A restraint  dummy  is in effect in 1967-69,  a period during 
which  union  leaders  are claimed  to have agreed  to modest  wage  increases 
in the interests  of economic stabilization.42  Then a "reentry,"  or wage- 
push, dummy  covers the three quarters  1969:4-1970:2.  The restraint 
dummy is insignificant,  but the wage-push  dummy is very large, con- 
tributing  a cumulative  wage increase  of almost 6 percent in column 4 
and  more  than  that  in column  5. 
Did the 1969-70 episode contribute  to a continuing  acceleration  of 
inflation?  The coefficient  on the wage-dummy  contribution  in the price 
equation  is relatively  large,  but at a very low level of significance.  More 
important  may have been the positive effect of the wage increases  on 
monetary  growth,  and of money growth  on price behavior.  Overall,  the 
results  seem to suggest  that the inflow  of dollar  reserves  was not the sole 
cause of the German  monetary  explosion  of 1970-72, and that at least 
some  of the  responsibility  rests  with  domestic  wage  developments. 
ITALY 
Although  significance  levels are  low, most  variables  in the basic  Italian 
money equation  are positive, indicating  an accommodative  rather  than 
41.  OECD,  Monetary Policy  in  Germany, Monetary Studies Series  (Paris: 
OECD, December 1973), pp. 43-50. 
42.  Ulman and Flanagan, Wage Restraint, pp. 186-91.  See also Gerhard Fels, 
"Inflation  in Germany,"  in Krause  and Salant, eds., Worldwide  Inflation,  pp. 619-20. 
Herbert  Giersch dates the voluntary restraint  back to a meeting between the German 
Council of Economic Advisers and representatives  of the trade unions and the em- 
ployers' associations on June 17, 1965, in A Discussion with Herbert Giersch: Cur- 
rent Problems of  the  West German Economy, 1976-1977  (American Enterprise 
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countercyclical  monetary  policy.  An acceleration  of the rise  in wages,  out- 
put, and traded-goods  prices,  and a larger  fiscal  deficit  all appear  to have 
stimulated  monetary  growth.  In contrast  to West  Germany  there  is no ac- 
commodation  of reserve inflows in 1971; quarterly  rates of monetary 
growth  in Italy  were  lower  in every  quarter  of 1971 than  in the correspond- 
ing quarter  of the preceding  "wage-push"  year, 1970. A structural  change 
appears  to have occurred  in 1973, since the equation  predicts  more than 
double  the monetary  growth  that actually  took place after  the end of the 
sample  period. 
The large and significant  coefficients  on the dummy  variables  in the 
Italian wage equations  suggest  that the Italian data are congenial  to a 
wage-push  interpretation.  The first  dummy  variable  applies  to the period 
in the early 1960s often described  by the term "wage  explosion."48  The 
second applies  to the single quarter  when the wage increases  following 
the  "hot  autumn"  of 1969 took effect. 
But, although  wage push helps explain  wages in Italy, the wage-push 
hypothesis  suffers  in the price  equation,  since  wage  increases  had  no influ- 
ence at all on price increases.  Nor did wage growth  have a substantial 
impact  on the monetary  authorities.  The Italian  central  bank appears  to 
have  behaved  in a destabilizing  procyclical  manner,  but more  in response 
to domestic  output  than to wage rates.  The absence  of price response  to 
the 1970 wage push is confirmed  by an inspection  of the data: the de- 
flator  for the Italian  GNP exhibits  a rate  of increase  in the first  three  quar- 
ters of 1970 that is almost  identical  to that of the same period  in 1969. 
Perhaps  the most surprising  aspect of the Italian inflation  performance 
was the absence  of any acceleration  during  the entire 1969-72 period. 
Economic  recovery  between 1966 and 1969 had already  caused a sub- 
stantial  acceleration  in wage and  price  change  before  the "hot autumn." 
Since 1973, Italian  wage  increases  have been considerably  more rapid 
than can be explained  by the coefficients  in the 1958-73 wage equation. 
A comparison  of columns  4 and 5 of table  9 indicates  that the coefficient 
on traded-goods  prices has become larger and much more significant. 
More than those in most other countries,  workers  in Italy have fought  to 
preserve  their real wages in the face of a spiral in traded-goods  prices 
caused  by the food and  oil supply  shocks  of 1973-74, and  by the depreci- 
ation of the lira beginning  in mid-1975. But the high positive  coefficient 
43.  Ulman  and Flanagan, Wage Restraint, pp.  202-03,  include the  interval 
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on monetary  growth  in the wage equation  when it is extended  through 
1976 suggests  that  the central  bank  may have considerable  leverage  over 
the behavior  of wage  rates  given  changes  in traded-goods  prices. 
JAPAN 
Japan  seems  to be the model  case in which  monetary  policy  responded 
primarily  to the growth  rate of international  reserves.  Most analyses  of 
Japanese  postwar  monetary  policy cite deteriorations  in the balance of 
payments  as the single factor behind  episodes  of monetary  restriction.44 
The basic money equation  in table 10, column 1, is consistent  with this 
overall  interpretation,  with the largest  positive  sum of coefficients  on re- 
serves  of any  country. 
But there seems to be more to an explanation  of monetary  behavior 
than a simple  reserves  effect.  Beyond that, the money supply  appears  to 
have responded  strongly  in a countercyclical  direction  to output  fluctua- 
tions. In fact, the accommodation  of reserve  inflows  in 1971 might not 
have been so extreme  had the economy  not been experiencing  a growth 
recession  in that year, with the trough of the output ratio occurring  in 
1971:4. 
Accounts  of Japanese  wage and price behavior  appear  unanimous  in 
denying any role for wage push.45  Perry's test for autonomous  wage 
change  in 1968 yielded a positive coefficient  on a dummy  variable  for 
that year but at a low level of significance.46  Perry's  conclusion  is con- 
firmed  in table 10, where dummy  variables  for 1968 and for 1970 are 
positive  but insignificant.  Further,  the absence  of any positive  impact  of 
wage change on monetary  growth argues against any lasting effect of 
autonomous  wage  movements  on the  inflation  rate. 
The pattern  of postsample  extrapolation  errors  is consistent  with that 
in other countries  and can be interDreted  in light of shifts in coefficients 
44.  OECD, Monetary Policy in Japan, Monetary Studies Series (Paris: OECD, 
December 1972),  p. 58. See also Gardner Ackley with collaboration of Hiromitsu 
Ishi, "Fiscal, Monetary,  and Related Policies,"  in Hugh Patrick  and Henry Rosovsky, 
eds., Asia's New Giant: How the Japanese  Economy Works (Brookings Institution, 
1976), pp. 169-71. Ackley and Ishi argue that it was the balance of payments alone, 
not domestic overheating  of inflation,  that guided the timing of the monetary authori- 
ties. 
45.  See ibid., p.  176. Also  Ryutaro Komiya and Yoshio Suzuki, "Inflation in 
Japan,"  in Krause  and Salant, eds., Worldwide  Inflation,  pp. 303-48. 
46.  Perry, "Determinants  of Wage Inflation around the World," table 6, p. 427. Robert  J. Gordon  443 
when the sample  period  is extended.  The huge overprediction  of mone- 
tary  growth  after  1973 is accounted  for largely  by the positive  coefficient 
on traded-goods  prices, which suggests  erroneously  that the oil shock 
would  be accommodated  rather  than  resisted.  Further,  the countercyclical 
behavior  during  1958-73 leads to the expectation  that the central  bank 
would  do more  than  it actually  did  to counteract  the unprecedented  1973- 
75 drop  in the output  ratio. 
SWEDEN 
The main  feature  of the Swedish  monetary  equation  is a countercycli- 
cal output  effect,  similar  to but  larger  in size  than  that  in the corresponding 
Japanese  equation.  The recent  problems  of the Swedish  economy,  lead- 
ing to the August  1977 devaluation,  may date  back  to the unique  Swedish 
response  to the 1974 supply  shocks  and  worldwide  recession.  In contrast 
to most countries,  which failed to pursue  vigorous  monetary  policies to 
counter  the recession,  the four-quarter  rate  of change  of money  in Sweden 
reached postwar peaks, around a 30 percent annual rate of growth, 
throughout  the 1974:3 to 1975:2 interval.47  As in the case of Canada  and 
Germany,  a negative coefficient  on traded-goods  prices in the sample 
period 1958-73 causes a postsample  prediction  of a drop in the money 
supply, in contrast  to the acceleration  that actually occurred  and that 
shifts  the coefficient  on traded-goods  prices  to a positive  value  in the ex- 
tended  money  equation. 
Appropriately  enough,  Swedish  wage  behavior  appears  to adhere  to the 
Scandinavian  model of the international  transmission  of inflation.48  The 
elasticity  of wage change  to changes  in world  prices  is very  large  in all of 
the wage equations.  A set of three  dummy  variables  was introduced  into 
the  wage  equations.  First,  following  Perry's  lead, a wage-push  dummy  was 
introduced  for 1970. Second,  a dummy  was included  for the subsequent 
year, to determine  whether  price restraint  had any effect on wage be- 
havior.49  Finally, a "reentry"  dummy  was entered to test whether any 
restraining  effect  in 1971 was  offset  in 1972. 
47.  This statement is equally valid for Ml  and M2. The four-quarter  rate of 
change of M1 peaked at 27.2 percent in 1974:3 and that for M2 at 34.0 percent in 
the same quarter. 
48.  Edgren and others, "Wages, Growth and the Distribution of Income," and 
Aukrust,  "Inflation  in the Open Economy." 
49.  Lars Calmfors, "Inflation  in Sweden,"  in Krause and Salant, eds., Worldwide 
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The signs  are  positive  on all three  dummy  variables  in the wage equa- 
tions, and  significant  in the case of the first  and  third,  indicating  that  wage 
change  was faster  than otherwise  would have been expected  during  the 
entire  1970-72 period.  The unsatisfactory  forecasting  performance  of the 
1958-73 wage  equations  is a consequence  of the implausibly  high coeffi- 
cient  on traded-goods  prices,  which  leads to the prediction  of much  faster 
wage  increases  in 1973-75 than actually  occurred.  The coefficient  drops 
to a much  more reasonable  level in the extended  equation  in column 5. 
All wage equations  exhibit  the same negative  coefficients  on money and 
the output  ratio,  perhaps  justifying  the skepticism  of Scandinavian  econo- 
mists  about  the monetarist  approach,  but  suggesting  a puzzle  that  requires 
further  research. 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
The results  for the United  Kingdom  are  perhaps  the most  interesting  of 
all, and offer  so many  positive  and significant  coefficients  that  both inter- 
national monetarists  and wage-push  proponents  will be pleased that 
their  approach  is vindicated,  but  dismayed  that  the opposite  framework  is 
validated  as well! The basic money  equation  indicates  significant  accom- 
modation  of both output  changes  and inflows  of reserves.  The monetary 
authority  appears  to have behaved  in a destabilizing  manner,  increasing 
the amplitude  of the output  business  cycle until forced by a balance-of- 
payments  constraint  to shift  to a restrictive  policy. 
The selection  of dummy  variables  for the wage and price equations  is 
designed  to test whether  alleged episodes of wage push actually  repre- 
sented a rebound  in the aftermath  of the various  periods  of wage freeze 
and restraint.  Periods  of applicability  of the various  dummy  variables  are 
those  selected  by the  Economist as subject  to a wage  "freeze,"  "restraint," 
or "reentry."50  In addition,  a special  dummy  is included  for the 1970 epi- 
sode that has made wage push a byword  among  British  economists.  In- 
deed, autonomous  movements  during  control  and reentry  periods  appear 
to be important  in explaining  British  wage  behavior.  Further,  the behavior 
50.  "Faith, Five Hopes, and Cassandra,"  Economist (July 23, 1977),  p. 75. The 
freeze dummy is in effect in 1961:3-1961:4;  1966:3-1966:4;  1972:4-1973:1.  The 
restraint dummy is  in  effect in  1962:1-1963:1;  1967:1-1969:4;  1973:2-1974:1; 
1975:2-1976:4.  The reentry dummy is in effect in 1963:2-1964: 1; 1970:1-1970:4; 
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of prices  appears  to have corresponded  to that  of wages,  in contrast  to the 
absence  of price response  to wage dummy  variables  in most other coun- 
tries. And as final icing to the wage-push  cake, the coefficient  on wages 
in the money equation  is positive and extremely  large in the extended 
sample  period. 
But international  monetarists  might respond that though the icing 
may  be impressive  the cake  within  is cardboard.  Somewhat  remarkably  in 
light  of the antimonetarist  orientation  of many  British  economists,  the in- 
fluence of money on wage behavior  is stronger  than it is in any other 
country.  Moreover,  the 1970 wage-push  episode  does  not appear  to repre- 
sent any profound  sociological phenomenon,  but simply an attempt  to 
catch  up for losses in real  income  during  the preceding  period  of restraint. 
Because  the restraint  dummy  is in effect  for so many  quarters  (line lOb), 
the cumulative  effect  of all the dummy  variables  taken  together  is strongly 
negative,  implying  that  total  wage  change  during  1958-73 was 26 percent 
less than  would  have  been expected  on the basis  of the contribution  of the 
other  coefficients.5' 
As further  support  for the monetarist  case,  the equations  for the United 
Kingdom  clearly  indict the Bank of England  as the major  culprit  in the 
1974-76  British wage explosion. Like workers  in all other countries 
except the United States and West Germany,  British workers  tried to 
maintain  their  real wages  in the face of the 1973-74 increases  in traded- 
goods prices.  The central  bank then responded  by accommodating  these 
wage  increases,  and  this  monetary  acceleration  fueled  a further  increase  in 
the rate  of wage  growth. 
Conclusion 
Despite the length  of this paper,  it should  be viewed as a preliminary 
effort. The episodes of  autonomous  wage changes captured here by 
dummy  variables  may be attributable  partially  to factors  unique  to each 
country-tax  changes, increases  in the minimum  wage, or changes in 
51. Another serious defect in the wage-push argument is evident if  account is 
taken of changes in the tax rate, a variable not included in this study. Large tax in- 
creases in  1967-69  would have justified a wage push by British workers even  if 
wage restraint  had not been in effect. See H. A. Turner and Frank Wilkinson, "Real 
Net Incomes and the Wage Explosion," New Society, vol. 17 (February 25, 1971), 
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unemployment  compensation  systems. Moreover, the results may be 
sensitive  to the particular  wage series  used in each country,  and  to errors 
in measuring  wages. The attempt  to fit a single money equation  to the 
period 1958-73  overlooks the likelihood that monetary  regimes may 
change.  Further  explorations  into the behavior  of monetary  authorities 
will require  experiments  to reveal  such  changes,  and  should  be conducted 
on a variety  of monetary  aggregates  and bases. Nevertheless,  several  in- 
teresting  conclusions  do emerge  from the results  presented  here. 
The paper  began  with three  quotations  setting  out the conflict  between 
the international-monetarist  and  wage-push  explanations  of the accelera- 
tion of world  inflation  during  the latter  part of the era of fixed exchange 
rates.  Which  of the quotations  survives  the confrontation  with  the data? 
Harry  Johnson  attributed  the acceleration  of world  inflation  ultimately 
to U.S. monetary  expansion.  Table 2 confirms  that world  inflation  is sig- 
nificantly  influenced  by the world  rate of monetary  growth,  to which  the 
United States contributes  about half. U.S. monetary  growth appears  to 
have had a significant  influence  on the growth  rate of U.S. wages, and 
U.S. prices then responded  to wage changes  with an elasticity  of unity. 
The rate of wage growth  in the Other  Seven appears  to have accelerated 
in 1969-70, well before the 1970-71  acceleration  in monetary  growth 
there,  but this does not rule  out a causal  role for U.S. monetary  behavior. 
The statistical  results  attribute  about  two-thirds  of this wage acceleration 
in the Other  Seven  to the influence  of a high output  level and an accelera- 
tion in the rise of world prices of tradable  goods, both of which were 
caused  partly  by the prior  U.S. monetary  acceleration.  As in the case of 
the United States, these wage increases  in the Other Seven were then 
passed  on as domestic  price  increases,  and the domestic  price  level in the 
Other  Seven  was also  pushed  up directly  by higher  world  prices  of tradable 
goods. 
Nicholas  Kaldor  prefers  to attribute  the acceleration  of world  inflation 
to a wage  push  caused  by trade-union  militancy.  The results  here provide 
little support  for this wage-push  interpretation.  About one-third  of the 
1967-70 acceleration  in wage  growth  in the Other  Seven  is attributable  to 
the contribution  of the dummy  variables  in the wage equation  for the 
Other  Seven.  But, as the Harberger  quotation  points  out, the other  macro- 
economic  effects required  for wage push to be a source of a continuing 
inflation  were  absent.  The portion  of the wage  acceleration  contributed  by 
the wage-push  dummy  variables  in the Other  Seven  did not feed through Robert  J. Gordon  447 
into price  change.52  Further,  there  is no sign  of the passive  accommodation 
of wage change  by monetary  authorities  required  if an inflation  initiated 
by wage push  is to continue.  A positive  effect of wages  on monetary  be- 
havior  is close to statistical  significance  only in the United  States,  where 
there was no sign of any autonomous  wage push. It is fitting  that the 
wage-push hypothesis comes closest to  fulfilling its  macroeconomic 
requirements  in the United Kingdom,  where it has received  such wide- 
spread  attention;  but even so the autonomous  upsurge  of wage change 
in 1969-70 appears  to have represented  a rebound  in the aftermath  of 
wage  controls  and  restraint  rather  than  a spontaneous  event. 
Is control  of the money supply  sufficient  to control  inflation?  Money 
growth  has a significantly  positive  impact  on wage growth  in four major 
countries  making  up 72 percent  of the 1976 GNP of the eight countries 
considered  here.53  Not only does this tend  to deny  the contention  of some 
wage-push  proponents  that wage claims  are numbers  "picked  out of thin 
air,"  but  it also supports  the international-monetarist  position  that  control 
of world  monetary  growth  is a crucial  requirement  in the determination  of 
the world  inflation  rate.  A qualification  is that  in the remaining  four  coun- 
tries  the effect  of money  on wages  is weak  or nonexistent.  A further  quali- 
fication  is that the estimated  elasticity  of wages  with respect  to money  is 
small, and that of prices with respect  to money is smaller  still. Finally, 
this effect of money on prices apparently  operates  in conjunction  with 
the  effect  of money  on output. 
The results indicate that the major competitor  to the international- 
monetarist  approach  as an explanation  of world  monetary  growth  is not 
the wage-push  hypothesis,  but rather  the countercyclical-reaction  func- 
tion. It does not appear  to be true, as proponents  of the international- 
monetarist  view contend, that the money supply in these countries  is 
automatically  set equal  to the demand  for money  by international  move- 
ments  of capital.  Instead,  in the money  equations  for most countries  there 
are negative coefficients  on either  tradable-goods  prices or the domestic 
output ratio, two important  positive  determinants  of the demand for 
money.  Further,  the positive  coefficients  on international  reserves  in the 
52. For the Other Seven the dummy contribution  had essentially a zero sign in 
the price equation, and in all countries  other than the United Kingdom its coefficient 
was insignificantly  different  from zero. 
53. The four countries are the United States, France, West Germany, and the 
United Kingdom. See note 32, which presents estimates of the money coefficients  in 
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money equations  for several countries  are consistent  with the counter- 
cyclical-reaction  approach  as well as the international-monetarist  view. 
Almost  all countries  experienced  periods  of monetary  restriction  as cen- 
tral  banks  responded  to some combination  of buoyant  growth  in output, 
imported  inflation,  and  reserve  outflows. 
The  study  reveals  differences  among  countries  in the  behavior  of money 
and  wage  rates  that  are  as interesting  as their  similarities.  Today's  dichot- 
omy  between  "healthy"  nations  like West  Germany  and  Japan,  caught  in 
a virtuous  circle of appreciation  and decelerating  inflation,  and "sick" 
nations  like Italy and  the United  Kingdom  (pre-1977),  caught  in a vicious 
circle  of depreciation  and persistent  inflation,  shows  up in differences  in 
behavior  before the advent of flexible exchange  rates in 1973. Growth 
cycles in the money supply in Germany  and Japan  appear  to have fol- 
lowed a countercyclical-reaction  pattern,  whereas accommodation  was 
the  rule  in Italy  and  the  United  Kingdom. 
The results  provide  little support  for the idea that central  banks  indi- 
rectly cause wage push through  prior episodes of accommodation.  In 
fact, the largest  coefficient  on wages in a money equation  occurs in the 
case  of the United  States,  which  exhibits  no evidence  of wage  push at all. 
On the other hand, one can apparently  pick today's healthy and sick 
nations  reasonably  well by the response  of wage rates to traded-goods 
prices.54  This in turn may reflect  in part a guess by trade unions in the 
sick  nations  that  any  attempt  to maintain  real  wages  in the face of the 1974 
supply  shocks  would  be accommodated  by central  banks. 
The  paper  provides  ample  support  for Lucas'  criticism  of econometric 
models  as forecasting  devices.55  Policy regimes  have changed  in the face 
54. Compare the  traded-goods coefficients in  the  extended wage equation in 
each of the tables. The size of the coefficients  appears  to be a rather accurate  inverse 
indicator  of the current  economic health of the major economies: 
Italy  0.753 
Sweden  0.682 
United Kingdom  0.404 
France  0.323 
Canada  0.282 
Japan  0.179 
United States  0.029 
West Germany  0.025 
55. Robert E. Lucas, Jr., "Econometric  Policy Evaluation: A Critique,"  in Karl 
Brunner and Allan  H.  Meltzer, eds.,  The  Phillips  Curve and  Labor Markets 
(North-Holland,  1976), pp. 19-46. Robert  J. Gordon  449 
of novel events  like the 1974 supply  shock. In the case of almost  every 
country,  money  equations  estimated  for the 1958-73 interval  make  huge 
forecasting  errors  during 1973-76; it appears  that the response  of the 
monetary  authorities  to changes  in traded-goods  prices  shifted  in the face 
of the striking  price increases  of  1974. Further,  the dramatic  contrast 
between  the volatility  of changes  in the wage rate in some of the Other 
Seven countries  and the sluggish  changes  exhibited  by the United States 
reminds  us that  we all take  for  granted  characteristics  of the U.S. economy 
that depend ultimately  on its labor-market  institutions  and that would 
change dramatically  if those institutions  resembled  the ones in Europe 
and  Japan. 
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Notes to Tables 4 through 12 
Unless otherwise indicated, all variables are one-quarter  rates of 
change  in percent.  The  numbers  in parentheses  are  t ratios. 
All coefficients  and t ratios  represent  the sum  of a series  of freely  esti- 
mated coefficients.  The number  of individual  coefficients  is as follows: 
All equations-lagged dependent  variable,  four  coefficients.  Money  equa- 
tion-wage  variable, current  and four lagged coefficients;  other inde- 
pendent  variables,  current  and three lagged  coefficients.  Wage and price 
equations-all  independent  variables, current and four lagged coeffi- 
cients. 
The money  concept  is M1  for all countries  except  Canada  and  France, 
for which  it is M2. 
In addition  to the coefficients  listed  in the tables,  each  equation  includes 
as additional  independent  variables  a constant  term and three seasonal 
dummy  variables. 
The money equations  contain  political dummy  variables  set equal to 
unity in the quarter  of each national election and the three preceding 
quarters,  with  one  political  dummy  coefficient  per  election. 
In cases  where  the sum  of coefficients  is not statistically  significant,  one 
or  more  individual  lagged  coefficients  nevertheless  may  be significant.  The 
superscripts  indicate  significance  at the 5 percent  level (one-tailed  test) 
of one or more  positive  individual  coefficients  (*); one or more  negative 
coefficients  (* *  ); and one or more  coefficients  of both signs (t). 
Standard  errors,  cumulative  extrapolation  errors,  and coefficients  on 
dummy  variables  are  listed  as percentages. 
Cumulative  errors  in line 12 do not include  the effect  of any dummies 
that  are  applicable  only in the period  after  1973: 1-for  example,  the  U.S. 
reentry  dummy  in table  4, line 9d. 
A detailed  data  appendix  is available  from  the author  on request. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Robert  E. Hal: The two most interesting  hypotheses  investigated  in Gor- 
don's paper  are, first,  the proposition  that monetary  expansion  and little 
else drives  inflation;  and second,  the contrary  proposition  that  wage  infla- 
tion rises or falls of its own accord,  independent  of money or other  de- 
terminants  of demand. To keep my discussion  simple, I will focus on 
wage rather  than price inflation.  The wage-push  hypothesis  is supported 
by any evidence  that wages  behave  in a way that is not predictable  from 
the behavior  of money and other determinants  of demand.  The extreme 
wage-push  hypothesis  requires,  moreover,  that demand  have no role in 
predicting  wages. The believer  in wage push is hoping  for a wage equa- 
tion with large  unexplained  residuals  and low coefficients  for money  and 
the real output  gap. Obviously,  Gordon's  research  cannot  fail to turn  up 
some evidence  in favor  of wage  push.  Everyone  grants  the wage equation 
some  residuals. 
Just the opposite evidence  would support  the monetarist  hypothesis. 
Wages  should  be highly  predictable  and  money  should  have an important 
role in the prediction.  The monetarist  hopes that the wage equation  will 
fit well and that demand  will matter.  It is noteworthy  that, from  the per- 
spective  of this paper,  much  of Gordon's  past research  has been devoted 
to establishing  a monetarist  proposition-namely, the success  of the Phil- 
lips curve.  Still, there  is an evident  bias in the procedure  of this paper  in 
favor of the wage-push  hypothesis-every user of econometrics  knows 
how easy  it is to run  unsuccessful  regressions. 
The interpretation  of Gordon's  results  for wages presents  some chal- 
lenges. For the purposes  of my discussion,  equation  3 in the individual- 
country  regressions  is the relevant  one. There is wide variation  among 
countries  in the standard  errors  of the regression.  The U.S. equation  is by 
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far the best, with a standard  error  of 0.18 (implying  a typical  forecast 
error  of wages one quarter  ahead  of 0.18 percent). Worst  are those for 
the United Kingdom (1.20),  Sweden (1.32),  and Italy (1.42).  But 
much of the success of the U.S. wage equation  arises from the lagged 
rates  of wage  inflation.  This finding  of persistent  wage  inflation  is no sur- 
prise: every  modern  Phillips  curve  has some kind of "expectation"  term 
of this kind.  What  is surprising  is the unimportance  of lagged  wage  infla- 
tion in many  other  countries.  This is a kind of confirmation  of the wage- 
push hypothesis:  there are isolated large surprises  in the inflation  rate 
that  make  the serial  correlation  of wage  changes  low or even  negative.  In 
any case, the unpredictability  of wage inflation  outside  the United  States 
is confirmed  by these  results. 
Money and other  demand  variables  are not without  influence  in some 
countries,  according  to Gordon. The wage-push  hypothesis  is not uni- 
versally  true in its extreme  form. Still, quite apart  from the subsidiary 
question  of why monetary  growth  has fluctuated,  these  results  make  clear 
that nowhere  is there a close correlation  between monetary  expansion 
and wage inflation  that operates  with only a brief  lag. My own view that 
money  has a quick  and strong  effect  on real output  but that its effect  on 
wages  and  prices  takes  much  longer  is not changed  by these  results. 
My principal  misgivings  about Gordon's  results  relate to their sensi- 
tivity  to measurement  error.  Nothing  in the procedure  can distinguish  be- 
tween  a wage  push  and  a blunder  by the national  statistical  agency.  Errors 
in measuring  money and other right-hand  variables  would also explain 
their  weakness  in Gordon's  regressions.  It seems  unlikely  that  a tight  rela- 
tionship  between  money and wages lurks  in his data, concealed  by mea- 
surement  errors,  but some part  of the findings  that are favorable  to wage 
push  are  probably  artifacts  of these  errors. 
A basic  point of the paper  is that  the wage  equation  has large  residuals 
in every country  but the United States. Gordon  chooses to express  this 
finding  by putting  in dummy  variables  for major  episodes  of unexplained 
wage inflation  and then noting the large coefficients  of these variables. 
Since fishing  around  for good dummies  is a notorious  practice  of certain 
schools  of econometrics,  it seems  to me that  the use of dummies,  to which 
I have no serious objections  here, can only detract  from the paper. It 
would  be much  better  just to show  the reader  the residuals.  Certainly  the 
reader  learns nothing  from the coefficients  of other variables  in regres- Robert  J. Gordon  471 
sions in which  dummies  make  up for the conspicuous  failure  of the vari- 
ables  to explain  major  episodes  of wage  inflation. 
Michael Parkin: International  monetarism  is  a body of  analysis that 
seeks to explain  world inflation  under a regime  of fixed exchange  rates. 
Wage push is a view of the causes of inflation  at the national level. In 
view of this fundamental  difference  in the phenomena  that they seek to 
explain,  it is difficult  to discriminate  between  these  two views  of the  world. 
Gordon  attempts  to do so by examining  inflation  at both the world  aggre- 
gate and national  levels. At the level of world aggregates,  international 
monetarism  looks convincing.  However,  at the national  level many  puz- 
zles remain,  including  in several  cases a complete  lack of significance  of 
monetary  factors  in the inflation  process. 
A fundamental  specification  problem  could be at the source of this. 
While  the international  monetarist  views  world  inflation  as determined  by 
a standard  macromonetary  process, he emphasizes  that at the national 
level, price movements  contain  important  relative-price  adjustments,  the 
national  inflation  rate  being equal  to the world  inflation  rate adjusted  for 
that nation's  relative-price  movements.  The source of national  relative- 
price movements  emphasized  by international  monetarists  is the differ- 
ence between ( 1  ) an individual  country's  differential  growth  rate  of pro- 
ductivity  in its traded-  and  nontraded-goods  sectors,  and (2) the average 
differential  in the rest  of the world.'  A country  whose  rate  of productivity 
growth  in its traded-goods  sector  exceeds  that  in its nontraded-goods  sec- 
tor by an amount  greater  than that which on average  is occurring  in the 
rest of the world will, under fixed exchange rates, experience  a rate 
of increase  in its domestic price index higher than the world average. 
This  consideration  determines  the trend  deviation  of a national  "inflation" 
rate from world inflation.  In addition,  there is room for cyclical devia- 
tions of the national  "inflation"  rate from world inflation,  again arising 
from changes  in international  relative  prices  as between  traded  and non- 
traded  goods. A country  that  is generating  an excessive  rate  of expansion 
of domestic credit will at the same time be experiencing  a current-ac- 
count deficit. This will be associated  with a rise in the price of its non- 
traded goods relative to the world price of traded goods since, as the 
1. See Michael Parkin, "World  Inflation,  International  Relative Prices and Mone- 
tary Equilibrium  Under Fixed Exchange Rates,"  in Robert Z. Aliber, ed., The Politi- 
cal Economy of Monetary Reform (London: Macmillan, 1977), pp. 220-42. 472  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1977 
country  attempts  to raise  its expenditure  level relative  to its income  level, 
it will substitute  toward  domestic  nontraded  goods, satisfying  its excess 
demand  for traded  goods from foreign  sources.  This substitution  in the 
production  process  will be associated  with a more  rapidly  rising  price of 
nontraded  goods.  Thus  the rate  of inflation  of domestic  prices  will deviate 
from the world inflation  rate both for trend  reasons (due to underlying 
differentials  in productivity  growth) and for reasons  due to cycles in the 
rates  of domestic  credit  expansion  and  the national  balance  of payments.2 
The above remarks  concerning  the national  price index also hold for 
the wage index and therefore  suggest  that Gordon's  formulation  of the 
determinants  of national  wage  changes  do not accord  with  the predictions 
of the international-monetarist  school.  He focuses  on what  might  be called 
closed-economy  monetarism  with the ad hoc addition  of an international 
relative  price-namely, the price  of the country's  actual  traded  goods (a 
simple  average  of export  and import  prices  for each country). His wage 
equation  for the international-monetarist  view has domestic  money, do- 
mestic  output,  traded-goods  prices,  and  international  reserves  as explana- 
tory  variables.  For the international  monetarist,  the wage  equation  for an 
individual  country  (in reduced  form) would  contain  the rate  of growth  of 
the world money supply,  the difference  between  the productivity  growth 
rates  in the tradables  and  nontradables  sectors  in the country  in question 
relative  to that difference  for the rest of the world. No other variables 
would appear  in an international  monetarist's  reduced-form  equation  for 
domestic  wage (or price) inflation. 
Gordon  presents  a full and fair account  of the wage-push  view put in 
perhaps  its best  light.  However,  his empirical  formulation  of the approach 
seems  to me to miss the central  proposition  that  that  school  has sought  to 
advance.  It also raises the oft-asked  question:  What  is the explanatory 
variable  (or set of explanatory  variables)  that  the wage-push  school  views 
as generating  inflation?  First, recall that the central  fact that the wage- 
push  school sought  to explain  was the widespread  tendency  for the short- 
run relationship  between inflation and unemployment  to drift upward 
following  1966. This, more  than anything  else, was what  gave  rise to dis- 
satisfaction  with the previously  conventionally  accepted  Phillips-curve 
2.  Michael Parkin, "Inflation, the Balance of  Payments, Domestic Credit Ex- 
pansion and Exchange Rate Adjustments,"  in Robert Z. Aliber, ed., National Mone- 
tary Policies and the International  Financial System (University of Chicago Press, 
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hypothesis  and to the widespread  popularity  of the invocation  of wage- 
push "sociological"  sources  of the "new  inflation."  Gordon's  formulation, 
at least  in the  way  it is implemented,  is incapable  of addressing  this  feature 
of the wage-push  school.  His procedure  of "peeking"  at the data  and  then 
dummying  out the large  residuals  amounts  in effect  to restricting  the  wage- 
push hypothesis  to one about "blips"  in the evolution  of wages. Many 
previous wage studies have suggested  that, apart from some sizable 
random  movements,  no mystery  attends  the overall  movement  of money 
wages,  given  the development  of other  standard  macroeconomic  variables 
that are widely alleged  to affect  wages. However,  the wage-push  propo- 
nent could still argue that his position has not really been tested. He 
would see the broad  trend  of monetary  policy, rather  than  its quarter-by- 
quarter  variation,  as the factor  responding  to whatever  underlying  social 
pressures  are  generating  inflation.  In other  words,  the wage-push  view (as 
I understand  it)  is a theory of broad trends  in inflation  rather  than of 
minute  movements  from  quarter  to quarter  or year to year.  That  broader 
formulation  is not addressed  in Gordon's  paper,  even though  that paper 
goes much further  than any previous  study  in trying  to do justice  to the 
wage-push  views.  The wage-push  advocate  would  probably  argue  that  the 
same factors that cause wages to rise also cause monetary  growth.  In 
other words, it is not that wages "cause"  money but that social forces 
(somewhat ill-defined) cause both rising wages and accommodating 
money. Causality  tests therefore  would require  the explicit  identification 
of the exogenous  social  variables. 
Of the battery  of coefficients  estimated  and reported  by Gordon,  only 
two emerge  as crucial  for discriminating  between  the  wage-push  and  inter- 
national-monetarist  hypotheses.  The first  is the coefficient  on wages  in the 
money  equation.  This needs  to be significantly  positive  for the wage-push 
view to be correct,  implying  that money accommodates  previous  wage 
movements.  Zero  coefficients  on wages  in the money  equation  would  indi- 
cate that wages  do not "cause"  money (that is, are not accommodated). 
On this test international  monetarism  scores eight and wage-push  zero. 
The second important  coefficient,  at least in the Gordon  framework,  is 
that  of the wage-push  dummy  variables  in the wage  equations.  The inter- 
national-monetarist  position requires  that these be zero while the wage- 
push view requires  them  to be significantly  positive.  On this competition, 
wage  push  wins  five  to three.  However,  the rules  of the game-"peeking" 
at the data  and  then simply  using  a dummy  variable  to pick  up the effects 474  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1977 
of any previously  observed  large  movements  in wages-virtually guaran- 
tee a victory  for the wage-push  view. Robert  Hall said enough  about  the 
difficulties  and  problems  with  using  dummy  variables  in this way.  As con- 
ceived by Gordon,  the international-monetarist  hypothesis  requires  that 
money appear  significantly  positive in the wage equations.  This result 
occurs only in the case of the United States, France, and the United 
Kingdom  with any strength,  and in the case of West Germany  with less 
strength.  For Sweden  there  is a significantly  perverse  effect  and for Can- 
ada and  Italy  no measurable  effect  at all. It may  appear  that  this  indicates 
a defeat  for the international-monetarist  position.  However,  as indicated 
above in the remarks  concerning  the appropriate  specification  of that 
view, there  is no strongly  predicted  relationship  between  national  money 
supply  and national  wages  unless  relative-wage  changes  arising  from  dif- 
ferentials  in international  productivity  growth  are also allowed  for. Fur- 
thermore,  collinearity  may be present,  arising  from the inclusion  of the 
output  ratio  as well as money  in these  wage  equations.  In view of the mis- 
specification  of the international-monetarist  hypothesis  concerning  move- 
ments of national  wages and national  prices, no strong  inference  about 
the appropriateness  of that set of hypotheses  can be drawn  from  the esti- 
mation  of the  particular  wage  equations  included  in this  paper. 
Despite its weaknesses,  this massive study by Gordon  does seem to 
contain  some elements  of policy conclusion.  They are  that,  insofar  as one 
can draw  inferences  from  this body of work,  monetary  policy  has to bear 
the brunt of the fight on inflation,  and, while direct controls can have 
some marginal  impact,  they do not appear  to be capable  of moving  the 
broad trend of inflation  away from where the monetary  aggregates  are 
taking  it. Much  more  important,  however,  than  the policy  conclusions  are 
those concerning  an agenda  for research.  Gordon  does not spell out such 
an agenda,  but in many  ways  one is implicit  in what  he has done.  The first 
question  that  arises  concerns  the identification  of the exogenous  causes  of 
wage push.  Not until such variables  have been specified  can proper  cau- 
sality tests be undertaken  that are capable  of rejecting  (or confirming) 
the wage-push  view. Second,  when the specification  is changed  so as to 
characterize  international  monetarism  and the wage-push  view more  pre- 
cisely, how robust are the empirical  findings?  This is the minimum  re- 
search  task that must  be undertaken  before  the questions  raised  here are 
finally  laid  to rest. Robert  J. Gordon  475 
Robert  J. Gordon:  Let me respond  to Parkin's  comment  by defending  the 
paper's  inclusion  of domestic  money  in the wage equation.  Parkin's  own 
account  of IM associates  a domestic  credit  expansion  with an increase  in 
prices  of domestic  nontraded  goods, which  must  be accompanied  by ( 1  ) 
an increase  in domestic  wages,  and (2) an  increase  in the domestic  money 
supply (unless reserve  flows totally  offset the domestic  credit  expansion, 
an extreme position rejected by previous empirical  work). The basic 
Dornbusch  IM paper (see text note 10 above) is centered  on the connec- 
tion between  domestic  wages  and  money. 
Parkin's  remarks  on wage push center  on the distinction  between  epi- 
sodic "blips"  and "broad  trends."  A basic point of the paper  is that  indi- 
vidual  episodes  of wage  acceleration  cannot  be a source  of a "broad  trend" 
toward  more  inflation  unless (1) the higher  wages  raise  prices  rather  than 
squeezing  profits,  and (2)  the money  supply  accommodates  the wage  in- 
creases.  Parkin  asks that "social  forces"  rather  than wages be linked to 
monetary  growth,  but it is hard  to see how these  forces could  be a source 
of inflation  without  raising  wages as well as money,  and this relationship 
should  be revealed  in positive  coefficients  on current  or past wages  in the 
money  equation  or both. 
Robert  Hall's  distaste  for dummy  variables  is understandable,  but  there 
is no available  altemative  to test for the presence  of autonomous  wage 
movements.  The paper  introduced  dummies  in the wage equation  not to 
soak up every extreme  residual,  but only for use in episodes  previously 
identified  by others  as cases  of wage  explosion  or acceleration.  The "peek- 
ing" involved only determining  the exact duration  of each episode, not 
the choice of the episodes  themselves.  Omission  of the dummy  variables 
would have biased  the coefficients  on the other  independent  variables  in 
the wage equation,  as is evident  in a comparison  of columns  3 and 4 of 
tables  4 through  12. In particular,  the impact  of money  on wages  is appre- 
ciably  stronger  when  the  dummy  variables  are  included. 
General  Discussion 
Several  participants  felt that Gordon  had not provided  an adequate 
test of the wage-push  hypothesis.  Thomas  Juster  cautioned  that the diffl- 
culty  of testing  for phenomena  such as "the  effect  of improved  communi- 476  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1977 
cations  on wage aspirations"  did not mean that they could be ignored  in 
serious  explanations  of wage  behavior.  Charles  Holt noted  that  some  suc- 
cess has been obtained  by Dicks-Mireaux  in using  proxies  for union ag- 
gressiveness  in wage equations,  and suggested  that Gordon  might have 
modeled such processes  more effectively.  Michael Wachter  argued  that 
since some versions  of wage push implied  that relative-wage  changes  in 
particular  sectors  trigger  inflation,  disaggregated  wage  equations  would  be 
needed  to test the wage-push  hypothesis.  Gardner  Ackley  pointed  out that 
in testing  for wage push, Gordon  had ignored  the role of the wage-deter- 
mination  process in regular  secular  movements  of wages and prices. A 
persistent  inflationary  push arising  from wage-setting  institutions  would 
not be identified  by Gordon's  tests. 
Several comments  were made about Gordon's  results. John Shoven 
observed  that the equations  were largely  unsuccessful  and confirmed  no 
hypothesis,  except  possibly  an extreme  version  of wage  push  such as Hall 
had in mind.  Money could  not be said  to cause  wage  or price  movements 
and wages could not be said to cause  changes  in money.  Edmund  Phelps 
was dissatisfied  because Gordon's equations  implied that a 1 percent 
change in both the money supply and traded-goods  prices would not, 
asymptotically,  imply  anything  like a 1 percent  change  in wages.  Together 
with  Martin  Baily, Phelps  also objected  that Gordon  had overlooked  the 
numerous  changes  in exchange  rates  that  had been made  under  the fixed- 
exchange-rate  regime  as well as the intervention  that has gone on under 
the system  of "flexible"  rates. Baily cautioned  that the exogeneity  tests 
Gordon  relied  on applied  only asymptotically  for large  samples,  and  were 
not reliable  for small  samples. 
James Duesenberry  and Ackley both found Gordon's  modeling of 
policy decisions  too simplistic.  Duesenberry  pointed out that monetary 
policy did not conform  to a single pattern.  At some times policymakers 
will accommodate  demand  shifts; at others they will pursue  a counter- 
cyclical  course.  And even  if they  might  initially  have a restrictive  reaction 
to an inflationary  shock, over a longer  horizon,  if the inflation  persisted, 
they might  well accommodate  the higher  track  in wages  and  prices.  Due- 
senberry  further  reasoned  that the trend  in wages would help determine 
the trend  in money, but that this connection  might  well be lost in equa- 
tions such as Gordon's.  Ackley stressed  the complexity  of policymakers' 
behavior. Policy might be wrong, and then changed as participants 
learned;  reactions  might be nonlinear,  different  for small than for large Robert  J. Gordon  477 
changes.  The evidence suggested  that policy is exogenous.  Attempts  to 
endogenize  policy have not been fruitful  and one did not learn as much 
from the statistical  summaries  represented  by Gordon's  equations  as one 
would  by simply  examining  policy  episodes  directly. 
Pentti Kouri  noted that the coefficient  on the reserves  variable  in the 
money-supply  equations  contained  a downward  bias and might incor- 
rectly  indicate  that the money supply  was exogenous  when  in fact it was 
moved  by reserves.  There  are, potentially,  two distinct  relations  between 
reserves  and the money supply, one positive and one negative. There 
would  be a positive  relationship  to the extent  that  authorities  did  not fully 
sterilize  a reserve  inflow;  there would be a negative  relationship  to the 
extent  that expansion  of the domestic  money  base led to some  decline  in 
foreign  reserves.  These effects  should  be isolated,  with only the first  one 
relevant  to Gordon's  inquiry. 
Gordon was sympathetic  with the reservations  of Duesenberry  and 
Ackley. Reactions  of policymakers  were complex,  and coefficients  in re- 
action functions  might  vary. If fixed coefficients  in the money equation 
turned  out to be insignificant  in the  paper,  indicating  exogeneity  of money, 
this did  not rule  out the possibility  that  endogenous  policy  reactions  might 
be identified  by further  research  with nonlinear  or variable  coefficients. 
Nevertheless,  several  strong  results  emerged  from the money equations, 
including  the failure of Japan  and Germany  to sterilize  reserve  inflows 
and the sensitivity  of Japan  to both the balance  of payments  and the do- 
mestic  business  cycle. 
Gordon  disagreed  with  Shoven's  remark  that  the results  did not exhibit 
strong  effects  of money  on wages.  Although  this  was true  in the aggregate, 
the significant,  if small,  coefficients  on money  in most  of the country  equa- 
tions  provided  evidence  that central  banks  may  have more  influence  over 
wage determination  than they realize.  In particular,  the strong  feedback 
between  money and wages in the extended  equations  for Italy and the 
United  Kingdom  shed  light  on a source  of their  problems  in the 1974-76 
interval. 